# TABLE OF CONTENTS

*Foreword by Judge LIU Daqun* ................................................................. i

*Foreword by Ambassador Martin Sørby* .............................................. v

1. On the Magic, Mystery and Mayhem of Preliminary Examinations ....... 1  
   *By Carsten Stahn, Morten Bergsmo and CHAN Ho Shing Icarus*
   1.1. The Quality Control Project ...................................................... 1  
   1.2. Preliminary Examinations at the International Criminal Court ..... 4  
   1.3. Functions, Meanings and Messages of Preliminary Examinations ................................................................. 6  
   1.4. Prosecutorial Managerialism ................................................... 9  
   1.5. Discretion ............................................................................. 14  
   1.6. Re-visiting Methodologies ................................................... 18  
   1.7. Contents of the Following Chapters ................................. 21  
   1.8. Not a Conclusion ................................................................. 32

## PART 1

**THE PRACTICE OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: REALITIES AND CONSTRAINTS**

2. Constraints and Quality Control in Preliminary Examination:  
   Critical Lessons Learned from the ICTY, the ICC, the ECCC  
   and the United Kingdom ................................................................. 35  
   *By Andrew T. Cayley*
   2.1. Pre-Investigative Activity at the ICTY .................................. 36  
   2.2. The Creation of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and  
       Pre-Investigative Activities at the ECCC ................................. 41  
   2.3. Pre-Investigative Activities and Complementarity in the United  
       Kingdom in Relation to the Iraq/UK Preliminary Examination .. 50  
   2.4. Conclusions ........................................................................ 61
3. The Concern for Quality Control and Norwegian Preliminary Examination Practice ................................................................. 65

By Runar Torgersen

3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 65
3.2. The Distinction between Preliminary Examination and Investigation in Norwegian Law .............................................. 65
3.3. The Scope of Preliminary Examinations in Norwegian Law in Different Types of Cases.............................................. 68
3.4. Quality Concerns in Preliminary Examinations ....................... 69
   3.4.1. ‘Quality’ in Criminal Procedure......................................................... 69
   3.4.2. Lack of Regulation as a Cause of Concern in Preliminary Examinations......................................................... 70
   3.4.2.1. Seeking Information in Favour of a Suspect ... 71
   3.4.2.2. Specification of the Suspicion............................................. 71
   3.4.2.3. Notification and Access to Information............. 71
   3.4.2.4. Right to Refute the Allegations and to Offer Additional Information........................................ 71
   3.4.2.5. Right to Demand Further Inquiries and Access to Court .............................................................. 71
   3.4.2.6. Speedy Inquiries........................................................................ 72
3.5. Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations ......................... 72

4. Preliminary Examination in the United States Military:
   Quality Control and Reform ........................................................................... 75

By Franklin D. Rosenblatt

4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 75
4.2. Non-Judicial Mechanisms of Military Preliminary Examination 77
4.3. Judicial Mechanisms of Military Preliminary Examination ...... 83
4.4. The Necessity to Conduct Preliminary Examination On-Scene .. 88
4.5. Enhancing a Culture of Quality Control for Military Preliminary Examination ........................................................ 94
4.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 99

5. Pre-Investigation and Accountability in India:
   Legal and Policy Roadblocks ............................................................................. 101

By Abraham Joseph

5.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 103
5.2. India and Core International Crimes................................................................. 104
   5.2.1. India’s Objection to the International Criminal Court .. 105
   5.2.2. India’s Approach to International Law Obligations..... 106
      5.2.2.1. Nellie Massacre (1983) .................................................... 106
5.2.2.2. Anti-Sikh Riots (1984) ........................................... 107
5.2.2.3. Hashimpura Killings (1987) .............................. 112
5.2.2.4. Mass Crimes in Gujarat: Godhra and its
          Aftermath .................................................... 112
5.2.2.5. Violence in Orissa against Christians .............. 115
5.2.3. Conclusion ....................................................... 117
5.3. Pre-Investigation/Investigation in Indian Criminal
      Procedural Law .................................................. 118
      5.3.1. The Pre-Investigative/Investigative Framework in
              India .................................................................. 118
      5.3.2. Police in India ............................................... 119
5.4. Suggestions and Conclusions .................................... 124

6. German Preliminary Examinations of International Crimes .......... 127
   By Matthias Neuner
   6.1. Germany’s Implementation of the ICC Statute ............. 127
       6.1.1. Competent Court ........................................... 128
       6.1.2. Federal Prosecutor General ............................. 129
   6.2. Objectives of Implementation and Preliminary Examinations .. 130
       6.2.1. Implementation .............................................. 131
       6.2.2. Preliminary Examination ................................. 131
          6.2.2.1. Primary Inferences from Law ....................... 131
          6.2.2.2. Secondary Inferences from Indirectly
                    Applicable Law and Practice ....................... 133
          6.2.2.3. Conclusion .............................................. 136
   6.3. Measures Available during Preliminary Examinations ......... 137
       6.3.1. Measures Infringing Human Rights .................... 137
       6.3.2. Overview of Means Available during Preliminary
              Examination .................................................. 137
          6.3.2.1. Open Source Analysis/Monitoring ................. 138
          6.3.2.2. Informal/Informative Questioning ............... 138
          6.3.2.3. Request Available Data from Other State
                    Authorities .............................................. 139
   6.4. Preliminary Examination in Practice .......................... 142
       6.4.1. Preliminary Examinations without Further
              Investigations .............................................. 142
          6.4.1.1. JIANG Zemin et al.
                    (People’s Republic of China) ......................... 142
          6.4.1.2. Ramzan Kadyrow (Chechen Republic
                    within the Russian Federation) .................... 145
          6.4.1.3. Almatov, Inoyatov et al. (Uzbekistan) ....... 146
6.4.1.4. Donald Henry Rumsfeld et al.  
(Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq) ....................... 150

6.4.2. Preliminary Examinations Leading to Formal  
Investigations (And Their Subsequent Closing) .......... 156

6.4.2.1. Against Unknown Persons (Drone Strike in  
Pakistan) .................................................. 156

6.4.2.2. Colonel Klein et al. (Aerial Bombardment  
near Kunduz/Afghanistan) ............................ 158

6.4.3. Common Arguments Advanced in Decisions on  
Preliminary Examinations .................................. 161

6.4.3.1. No Specific Link of the Alleged Perpetrator  
to Germany ..................................................... 162

6.4.3.2. Preventive Judicial Assistance ..................... 165

6.4.3.3. Subsidiarity ................................................. 168

6.4.3.4. Immunity ..................................................... 170

6.5. Quality Control of Preliminary Examinations ............. 173

6.6. Conclusion .......................................................... 176

7. The Legalistic Function of Preliminary Examinations:  
Quality Control as a Two-Way Street .......................... 179

By Matilde E. Gawronski

7.1. Introduction ............................................................ 179

7.2. Preliminary Examinations as a Legalistic Process .......... 181

7.2.1. The Legalistic Nature of Preliminary Examinations . 181

7.3. The Preliminary Examination Work Process in Brief ...... 185

7.3.1. Phase 1 ............................................................. 186

7.3.2. Phase 2: Jurisdiction ................................................. 187

7.3.3. Phase 3: Admissibility ............................................. 190

7.3.4. Phase 4: Interests of Justice ................................. 192

7.3.5. Article 53(1) Report .................................................. 194

7.4. The Concepts of ‘Quality’ and ‘Quality Control’ in the  
Context of Preliminary Examinations ....................... 195

7.4.1. Quality and Preliminary Examinations:  
A View from the OTP ................................................. 195

7.4.2. Internal Quality Control and External Quality  
Enhancement ............................................................ 198

7.5. Quality Control and Enhancement in the Preliminary  
Examination Process .................................................. 200
7.5.1. Quality Control in Phase 1 .................................................. 201
7.5.2. Quality Control in the Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Assessment of Phase 2 .......................................................... 203
7.5.3. Quality Control in the Complementarity
Assessment of Phase 3 .......................................................... 209
7.5.4. Quality Control in the Interests of Justice
Assessment of Phase 4 .......................................................... 214
7.6. Conclusions ............................................................................ 220

8. The Pre-Preliminary Examination Stage:
Theory and Practice of the OTP’s Phase 1 Activities .............. 223

By Amitis Khojasteh

8.1. Introduction ............................................................................. 223
8.2. Overview of the Phase 1 Process ........................................... 227
  8.2.1. Initial Basic Filtering .......................................................... 228
  8.2.2. Analysis of ‘Warrant Further Analysis’
         Communications .................................................................. 229
           8.2.2.1. Applicable Standard at Phase 1 .......................... 230
           8.2.2.2. Scope and Nature of the Analysis ..................... 232
           8.2.2.3. Internal Review and Timelines ......................... 237
8.3. Prosecutorial Discretion at Phase 1 ....................................... 238
8.4. Transparency in and Publicity of Phase 1 Activities .......... 241
8.5. Quality Control in Phase 1 .................................................... 248
8.6. Conclusion .............................................................................. 252

PART 2
CASE STUDIES OR SITUATION ANALYSIS

9. The ICC Involvement in Colombia:
Walking the Fine Line between Peace and Justice .............. 257

By Marina Aksenova

9.1. Introduction ............................................................................. 257
9.2. The Dialogical Model of the ICC Involvement in Colombia ... 263
9.3. Compatibility of Standards ..................................................... 274
  9.3.1. New Vision of Justice – Less Retribution, More
         Reparations ........................................................................ 274
  9.3.2. Prioritization ...................................................................... 275
  9.3.3. Penalties ........................................................................... 277
  9.3.4. Command Responsibility .................................................. 279
9.4. Conclusion .............................................................................. 281
10. ‘Magical Legalism’ and the International Criminal Court: A Case Study of the Kenyan Preliminary Examination

By Christian M. De Vos

10.1. Introduction .......................................................... 283
10.2. Preliminary Examinations and the OTP .................................................. 288
  10.2.1. Legal Framework .................................................. 288
  10.2.2. Relationship to Complementarity ........................................... 293
10.3. The ICC’s Preliminary Examination in Kenya ........................................... 296
  10.3.1. The Waki Commission and the ICC: January–October 2008 .................. 298
  10.3.2. Special Tribunal for Kenya: October 2008–February 2009 .................. 300
  10.3.3. Subsequent Efforts: March–November 2009 .......................... 304
10.4. The Kenyan Examination Reconsidered ............................................ 306
  10.4.1. Understanding of Domestic Political Context .......................... 306
  10.4.2. Overconfident and Underprepared ............................................ 308
  10.4.3. A Complementarity Conundrum .............................................. 310
10.5. Conclusion ........................................................................ 312

11. Challenges in the Relationship between the ICC and African States: The Role of Preliminary Examinations under the First ICC Prosecutor

By Benson Chinedu Olugbue

11.1. Introduction ...................................................................... 318
  11.1.1. The Prosecutor of the ICC ............................................. 322
11.2. The Theory of Prosecutorial Neutrality ........................................... 325
  11.2.1. Prosecutorial Neutrality: Convergence of Domestic and International Criminal Law Systems ...................................... 327
11.3. Prosecutorial Discretion and Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations ................................................................. 331
  11.3.1. General Principles of Prosecutorial Discretion during Preliminary Examinations .................................................. 332
  11.3.1.1. Independence during Preliminary Examinations ...................... 332
  11.3.1.2. Impartiality during Preliminary Examinations ......................... 334
  11.3.1.3. Objectivity during Preliminary Examinations ......................... 334
11.3.2. Prosecutorial Discretion and Policy Objectives
Guiding Preliminary Examinations .......................... 335
  11.3.2.1. Transparency during Preliminary Examinations .................... 335
  11.3.2.2. Ending Impunity through Positive Complementarity during Preliminary Examinations .................. 336
  11.3.2.3. Prevention of International Crimes during Preliminary Examinations .................... 337

11.4. Preliminary Examinations and Referral of Situations to the Court .................................................. 339
  11.4.1. Referral of a Situation by a State Party .................. 339
  11.4.2. Initiation of an Investigation by the Prosecutor .......... 341
  11.4.3. Referral by the UNSC ......................................... 343
  11.4.4. Referrals and Prosecutorial Discretion during Preliminary Examinations .......................... 344
  11.4.5. Admissibility and Prosecutorial Discretion ............ 345

11.5. Prosecutorial Neutrality and Case Studies of Preliminary Examinations Conducted in Africa .................. 347
  11.5.1. Neutrality as Non-biased Decision-making ............... 347
  11.5.2. Neutrality as Non-partisan Decision-making .......... 349
  11.5.3. Neutrality as Principled Decision-making ............... 351
  11.5.4. Uganda and Central African Republic .................... 355
  11.5.5. Sudan and Libya ............................................. 357
  11.5.6. Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire .................................... 358

11.6. The Exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor in Preliminary Examinations in Six African Countries – Key Findings ............ 359
  11.6.1. The Significance of the Theory of Prosecutorial Neutrality ............................................. 363
  11.6.2. Formal Independence of the ICC Prosecutor ............ 364
  11.6.3. Legal Basis for Prosecutorial Discretion for Preliminary Examinations and Guidance ............. 364
  11.6.4. Accountability Mechanisms Regulating the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion .................. 365

11.7. Conclusion ............................................................................. 366

12. Dealing with the Ongoing Conflict at the Heart of Europe:
On the ICC Prosecutor’s Difficult Choices and Challenges in the Preliminary Examination into the Situation of Ukraine .................. 371
  By Iryna Marchuk
  12.1. Introduction ..................................................................... 371
  12.2. Background ..................................................................... 373
12.3. Uneasy Relationship between Ukraine and the ICC: Constitutional Conundrum .................................................. 376
12.4. The ICC Prosecutor’s Preliminary Examination into the Maydan Crimes (Declaration I) ........................................... 379
12.5. The ICC Prosecutor’s Preliminary Examination into the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Declaration II) ...................... 387
  12.5.1. International, Non-International or Hybrid Armed Conflict in Ukraine? ......................................................... 389
  12.5.2. No Prospects of Justice in Eastern Ukraine without the ICC Prosecutor’s Involvement? .............................. 391
  12.5.3. The ICC Prosecutor’s Access to Evidence and Co-operation with National Authorities in Ukraine ...... 393

13. Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq? Examining the Nexus between International and National Justice Responses .................................................. 399

  By Thomas Obel Hansen
  13.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 399
  13.2. Preliminary Examinations and Positive Complementarity ...... 402
    13.2.1. Assumptions about the Connection between Preliminary Examinations and Positive Complementarity ......................... 402
    13.2.2. Lack of Empirical Support and Conceptual Clarity concerning Positive Complementarity ......................... 404
    13.2.3. OTP Standards Relating to Positive Complementarity at the Preliminary Examination Phase .................. 408
  13.3. The Iraq/UK Preliminary Examination: Status and Crimes under Scrutiny .......................................................... 410
    13.3.1. Closing and Re-opening of the Iraq/UK Examination and Broader Context .................................................. 410
    13.3.2. The Alleged Crimes ............................................................................................................................... 415
  13.4. The OTP’s Strategies, Expectations to Domestic Accountability Processes and Engagement with Other Actors.. 420
    13.4.1. Best Case Scenario and Challenges to Positive Complementarity ......................................................... 420
    13.4.2. Key Factors in the Complementarity Assessment ............ 422
    13.4.3. OTP Engagement with Other Stakeholders .................. 425
    13.4.4. Is the OTP Treating the Iraq/UK Examination Differently from Other Preliminary Examinations? .... 428
  13.5. UK Government Responses to the Preliminary Examination ... 429
13.5.1. Overall Responses to the ICC’s Re-opening of the Preliminary Examination ........................................ 429
13.5.2. Judicial Processes in the UK Addressing Crimes in Iraq and their Connections to the Preliminary Examination .......................................................... 432
13.5.3. The Establishment and Closure of IHAT ...................... 435
13.5.4. How the Fall of PIL Became IHAT’s Fall – Will it Become the Preliminary Examination’s Fall Too? ...... 442
13.5.5. The Road Ahead for Accountability in the UK .......... 445
13.6. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 448

   By Rachel Kerr
   14.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 452
   14.2. The Iraq War ............................................................................................................. 455
   14.3. War Crimes ............................................................................................................. 458
   14.4. Trials and Tribulations .............................................................................................. 460
      14.4.1. Prosecutions ........................................................................................................ 460
      14.4.2. Inquiries ............................................................................................................. 465
      14.4.3. IHAT and the Iraqi Civilians Litigation .............................................................. 468
      14.4.4. The ICC’s Preliminary Examination ................................................................. 475
   14.5. The Fallout: Law(yers), Politics and War (Crimes) ................................................. 480
   Appendix 2: Courts Martial ............................................................................................ 487
   Appendix 3: Judicial Review Cases ................................................................................. 488

15. The Situation of Palestine in Wonderland: An Investigation into the ICC’s Impact in Israel ................. 493
   By Sharon Weill
   15.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 493
   15.2. On Deterrence: The Saga of the Settlement Regulation Law ...................................... 494
      15.2.1. The Legislative Process and ICC Appearance ................................................. 496
   15.3. The (Unintended) Impact on NGOs .......................................................................... 500
      15.3.1. The Shrinking Space ......................................................................................... 500
      15.3.2. De-legitimization and Personal Attacks ............................................................ 500
   15.4. Economic Pressure and Its Limits ............................................................................. 502
   15.5. The ICC in the Israeli Press ...................................................................................... 504
   15.6. Positive Complementarity? ...................................................................................... 507
15.6.1. From the Duty to Investigate and Prosecute to the Duty to Examine and Re-examine .................. 509
  15.6.1.1. Criminal Investigation ................................ 509
  15.6.1.2. Effective Investigation ............................... 509
  15.6.1.3. Examination .............................................. 510
  15.6.1.4. Israeli Narratives for Closing Examination .... 511
15.6.2. Main Structural Deficiencies .............................. 513
  15.6.2.1. Independency and Impartiality ..................... 513
  15.6.2.2. Civilian Supervision and the Israeli High Court of Justice: From Abstention to Deference ......... 514
15.7. Conclusion .............................................................. 518

16. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of the Georgia Situation ........................................ 521

By Nino Tsereteli

16.1. Introduction .............................................................. 521
16.2. Unpacking the Notion of ‘Quality Control’ ............... 523
  16.2.1. Defining ‘Quality’ ............................................. 523
  16.2.2. Defining ‘Control’ ............................................. 527
    16.2.2.1. Rationale of Control .................................. 527
    16.2.2.2. The Meaning of Control ............................... 528
    16.2.2.3. Types of Control: Political, Social, Judicial .. 529
    16.2.2.4. Transparency and Control ............................ 533
16.3. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of the Georgian Situation ........................................ 536
  16.3.1. Political Control .............................................. 536
  16.3.2. Social Control ................................................. 541
  16.3.3. Reflections on Political and Social Control and their Interplay ............................................. 543
  16.3.4. Prosecutor’s Response to Competing Social and Political Pressures ........................................ 544
  16.3.5. Judicial Control .................................................. 547
    16.3.5.1. Major Disagreements in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision .............................................. 548
    16.3.5.2. Reflections on the Quality of Judicial Control .......................................................... 550
16.3.6. Transparency and Control in the Georgian Preliminary Examination ........................................ 552
16.4. Concluding Remarks ................................................... 553
17. The Venture of the Comoros Referral at the Preliminary Examination Stage .............................................................. 555

*By Ali Emrah Bozbayındır*

17.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 555
17.2. Procedural History .............................................................................................. 560
17.3. Factual Basis ........................................................................................................ 564
  17.3.1. The Importance of the Human Rights Council Report ............... 564
  17.3.2. Interception of the Gaza Flotilla by the Israeli Navy and Its Aftermath: Factual Overview and a Summary of the Cases .......................................................... 565
  17.3.2.1. Events aboard the *Mavi Marmara* ............................................. 565
  17.3.2.2. Events aboard the *Eleftheri Mesogios* and the *Rachel Corrie* ......... 576
17.4. Preliminary Legal Issues ...................................................................................... 576
  17.4.1. Legal Characterization of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ....................... 577
  17.4.2. The International Law of Naval Blockade and the Question of the Legality of the Israeli Blockade on Gaza and the Legality of Israeli Attack on the Gaza Flotilla ..................................................... 584
17.5. Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court ...................................................... 602
  17.5.1. War Crimes ................................................................................................. 603
  17.5.1.1. Wilful Killing (Article 8(2)(a)(i)) ............................................ 610
  17.5.1.2. Torture or Inhuman Treatment (Article 8(2)(a)(iii)) ..................... 610
  17.5.1.3. Wilfully Causing Great Suffering (Article 8(2)(a)(iii)) ............... 612
  17.5.1.4. Extensive Destruction and Appropriation of Property, Not Justified by Military Necessity and Carried Out Unlawfully and Wantonly (Article 8(2)(a)(iv)) ....................... 613
  17.5.1.5. Acts of Unlawful Deportation or Transfer or Unlawful Confinement (Article 8(2)(a)(vii)) ......................................................... 613
  17.5.1.6. Intentionally Directing Attacks against the Civilian Population as Such or against Individual Civilians Not Taking Direct Part in Hostilities (Article 8(2)(b)(i)) ............... 614
  17.5.1.7. Intentionally Directing Attacks against Civilian Objects (Article 8(2)(b)(ii)) .......... 614
17.5.1.8. Intentionally Directing Attacks against Personnel, Installations, Material, Units or Vehicles Involved in a Humanitarian Assistance or Peacekeeping Mission in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as Long as They Are Entitled to the Protection Given to Civilians or Civilian Objects under the International Law of Armed Conflict (Article 8(2)(b)(iii))........... 615

17.5.1.9. Pillaging a Town or Place, Even When Taken by Assault (Article 8(2)(b)(xvi))........ 618

17.5.1.10. Committing Outrages upon Personal Dignity, in Particular Humiliating and Degrading Treatment (Article 8(2)(b)(xxi)).. 618

17.5.1.11. Conclusion............................................................... 619

17.5.2. Crimes against Humanity............................................. 619

17.6. Main Issues ........................................................................ 623

17.6.1. Methodology: The Relationship with Other Fact-Finders .............................................. 623

17.6.2. Analysis of the Prosecutor’s and Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Gravity Assessments ..................... 631

17.6.3. Prosecutorial Discretion and Judicial Review ............. 650

17.6.3.1. Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision .................. 651

17.6.3.2. The Appeals Chamber ........................................... 654

17.7. The Turkish-Israeli Agreement: An Amnesty? ................. 660

17.8. Concluding Remarks .......................................................... 664

17.9. Postscript ............................................................................ 668

Index .......................................................................................... 671

TOAEP Team.............................................................................. 681

Other Volumes in the Publication Series ..................................... 683
Editors’ Foreword to Volume 2

PART 3
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS

18. Prosecutorial Ethics and Preliminary Examinations at the ICC

By Alexander Heinze and Shannon Fyfe

18.1. Introduction

18.2. Prosecutorial Ethics

18.2.1. The Relationship between Law and Morality

18.2.2. Justice and Fair Trials

18.2.3. Normative Foundations for Specific Prosecutorial Duties

18.3. Prosecutorial Ethics in International Criminal Law

18.3.1. Ius Punendi and Purpose of Punishment in International Criminal Law

18.3.2. Ethics and International Criminal Law

18.3.2.1. Normative Moral Foundations for International Criminal Law

18.3.2.2. Universal Jurisdiction

18.3.2.3. Normative Moral Foundations for the ICC

18.3.3. Ethical Obligations for the OTP

18.3.3.1. General Ethical Rules

18.3.3.2. Accountability Mechanisms

18.4. Prosecutorial Discretion and Preliminary Examinations at the ICC

18.4.1. Legal Principles of Prosecutorial Discretion

18.4.2. Preliminary Examinations and Article 53(1)

18.4.3. Prosecutorial Discretion and the “Interests of Justice”

18.4.3.1. The OTP and Article 53(1)(c)

18.4.3.2. Whose Justice?

18.4.3.3. Political Considerations and Article 53(1)(c).

18.4.3.4. Deontological and Consequentialist Obligations under Article 53(1)(c)
18.4.4. Accountability Mechanisms and Judicial Review ........ 61
18.5. Specific Recommendations for OTP Ethics in the Preliminary
Examination Phase ......................................................... 63
18.5.1. Suggested Ethical Obligations ................................ 63
  18.5.1.1. Revisions to the OTP’s Policy Guidelines .......... 63
  18.5.1.2. Concretization of the OTP’s General Ethic
             Rules (Especially its Code of Conduct) .......... 71
18.5.2. Suggested Internal Accountability Mechanisms ...... 75
18.6. Conclusion .................................................................. 75

19. Politics, Power Dynamics, and the Limits of Existing Self-Regulation
   and Oversight in ICC Preliminary Examinations .................... 77
   
   By Asaf Lubin
   
   19.1. Introduction .......................................................... 78
   19.2. Normative Framework ................................................. 84
         19.2.1. Legislative Structures .................................... 84
         19.2.2. Prosecutorial Independence and External Review .... 90
   19.3. Existing Oversight Mechanisms ................................. 95
         19.3.1. Self-Regulation (‘Office Common Law’) .......... 96
                 19.3.1.1. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations... 100
                 19.3.1.2. Public Reporting on Preliminary
                           Examinations ........................................ 105
                 19.3.1.3. Termination of Preliminary Examinations
                           Reports ................................................. 106
                 19.3.1.4. Press Releases and Reporting to the UNSC
                           and the ASP ........................................... 109
         19.3.2. Judicial Review by the PTC .............................. 110
                 19.3.2.1. Central African Republic .......................... 113
                 19.3.2.2. Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece, and
                           Cambodia ............................................. 115
   19.4. The Palestinian Preliminary Examination and the Limits of
       Existing Oversight Mechanisms .................................. 121
       19.4.1. The Preliminary Examination on Palestine:
               Background ..................................................... 121
       19.4.2. Politicization of the Court ................................ 125
       19.4.3. Prioritization Policies and Exit Strategies .......... 130
       19.4.4. Evidentiary Standards at the Preliminary Examination
               Stage .......................................................... 136
   19.5. Areas for Potential Reform ....................................... 143
19.5.1. Re-phasing of the Preliminary Examination Phase ..... 143
19.5.2. Redefining the Relationship between the OTP and the PTC ...................................................... 145
19.5.3. Redrafting Existing OTP Policy Papers and the Adoption of New Policies ................................ 146
19.5.4. External Review Processes ..................................... 148
19.6. Conclusion ........................................................................... 149

20. Disarming the Trap:
Evaluating Prosecutorial Discretion in Preliminary Examinations beyond the False Dichotomy of Politics and Law ......................... 151

By Jens Iverson

20.1. Introduction ............................................................................ 151
20.2. Defining the Trap: The Context of Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations .............................................. 155
20.3. What is Quality in Quality Control? ..................................... 161
20.4. Quality in Preliminary Examination as Potential Didactic Effect ........................................................................... 162
20.5. Contrasting ‘Optimal’ and ‘Maximal’ Choices ......................... 164
20.6. Pragmatism and Didactics .................................................... 172
20.7. A Pragmatic Approach to the Didactic Effect of Choices Made in Preliminary Examinations .............................................. 174
20.8. Limitations to Using Criminal Proceedings as a Means to a Didactic End ................................................................. 175
20.9. Conclusions ........................................................................... 178

21. Make the ICC Relevant:
Aiding, Abetting, and Accessorizing as Aggravating Factors in Preliminary Examination ................................. 181

By Christopher B. Mahony

21.1. Introduction ............................................................................ 181
21.1.1. Considering the ICC’s Deterrent Effect .............................. 183
21.2. Globalization, Liberalism and Proxy-War’s Enablement ........ 186
21.2.1. Conflict’s Multi-dimensional Causes .............................. 187
21.2.2. Syria: A Permissive Global System’s Emblematic Proxy-War ........................................................................... 189
21.2.3. How the Global System and Its Leadership Ignore Contemporary Conflicts ................................................... 193
21.3. Prosecuting Aiding, Abetting and Accessorizing as a Response to Proxy War ................................................................. 195
21.3.1. Gravity in Preliminary Examination and the Aiding, Abetting and Accessorizing of Crimes............ 196
21.4. The Legal Threshold of Aiding, Abetting and Accessorizing,... 199
  21.4.1. Aiding and Abetting under the Rome Statute ............ 200
  21.4.2. Accessorizing under the Rome Statute ................. 204
21.5. Aiders, Abettors, and Accessories in Afghanistan .......... 205
21.6. Conclusion....................................................... 209

22. The Standard of Proof in Preliminary Examinations .............. 213
  By Matthew E. Cross
  22.1. Interpreting Article 53(1) of the Statute: Defining the Standard of Proof................................................. 217
     22.1.1. Ordinary Meaning of the Term “Reasonable Basis to Believe” in Article 53(1)................................. 220
     22.1.2. Context of the Standard of Proof in Article 53(1)..... 224
     22.1.3. Object and Purpose of the Statute and Article 53(1):
             A Selective Approach to Investigations .................. 234
     22.1.4. The Article 53(1) Standard of Proof: A Summary .... 238
  22.2. The Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Article 53(1)...... 238
  22.3. Consequences of the Standard of Proof in Article 53(1) .... 243
     22.3.1. A Duty to Evaluate the Available Information ......... 244
     22.3.2. Prohibitive Effect of Insufficient or Ambiguous
             Information .................................................. 245
     22.3.3. Selectivity in Publicly Reported Criminal Allegations
             in ‘Positively-resolved’ Preliminary Examinations ....... 247
     22.3.4. No De Novo Judicial Review ................................ 250
  22.4. Conclusion.......................................................... 251

23. Reconceptualizing the Birth of the International Criminal Case:
    Creating an Office of the Examining Magistrate .............. 255
  By Gregory S. Gordon
  23.1. Introduction ........................................................ 255
  23.2. The Preliminary Examination Process and Objectives ....... 257
     23.2.1. Preliminary Examination Triggers ......................... 258
            23.2.1.1. Communications and Referrals ..................... 258
            23.2.1.2. The Providers and Nature of Information
                    Received ............................................. 259
            23.2.1.3. Procedural Presumptions ......................... 260
     23.2.2. The Four Phases ............................................. 260
            23.2.2.1. Phase 1: Initial Assessment ....................... 260
            23.2.2.2. Phase 2: Jurisdiction Assessment ................. 261
23.2.2.3. Phase 3: Admissibility Assessment ............ 263
23.2.2.4. Phase 4: Interests of Justice Assessment ...... 264
23.2.3. Preliminary Examination Activities....................... 265
23.2.4. Preliminary Examination Termination................... 267
23.2.5. Preliminary Examination Objectives.................... 267

23.3. A Preliminary Examination Record of Timeline Inconsistency, Politicization and Uneven Results............................................. 268
23.3.1. Timeline Inconsistencies ....................................... 268
23.3.1.1. Preliminary Examinations Triggered by Communications ........................................ 268
23.3.1.2. Preliminary Examinations Triggered by Referrals ........................................ 280
23.3.2. Politicization of Cases ......................................... 282
23.3.2.1. Personality-Driven Politics ............................... 282
23.3.2.2. Situation-Driven Politics ................................. 284
23.3.2.3. Uneven Results........................................ 287

23.4. A Proposed Solution: Creation of the Office of the Examining Magistrate ......................................................... 289
23.4.1. Background................................................... 289
23.4.2. Foundations: The Civil Law Examining Magistrate and the ECCC’s Office of Co-Investigating Judges .... 291
23.4.2.1. The Traditional Civil Law Examining Magistrate.............................................. 291
23.4.2.2. The Internationalization of the Examining Magistrate: The Office of the Co-Investigating Judges at the ECCC ...... 293
23.4.3. Integrating the Office of the Examining Magistrate into the ICC Preliminary Examination Framework ..... 296
23.4.3.1. The Stages of the Process................................. 296
23.4.3.2. Timeline Parameters...................................... 301
23.4.3.3. Other Logistical Considerations......................... 303

23.5. Potential Advantages and Disadvantages to Integrating the OEM into the Existing Structure ................................. 305
23.5.1. An Analysis of Potential Advantages ......................... 305
23.5.1.1. Promoting Retributive Justice .......................... 305
23.5.1.2. Promoting Procedural Justice .......................... 306
23.5.1.3. Promoting Restorative Justice ......................... 308
23.5.2. An Analysis of Potential Disadvantages.................... 309
23.5.2.1. Creating Unnecessary Rigidity ......................... 309
23.5.2.2. Restricting Prosecutorial Discretion ................. 309
23.5.2.3. Ballooning Bureaucracy and Expenses ............ 310
23.5.3. A Net Positive Assessment .................................................. 311
    23.5.3.1. In Reference to Potential Inflexibility and
               Restricted Prosecutorial Discretion ........... 311
    23.5.3.2. Bureaucracy and Budget ........................................ 314
    23.5.3.3. The Other Advantages Already Considered .. 314

23.6. Conclusion .............................................................................. 315

PART 4
TRANSPARENCY, CO-OPERATION AND PARTICIPATION
IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

24. Deterrence or Withdrawals?
    Consequences of Publicising Preliminary Examination Activities..... 321

By Ana Cristina Rodríguez Pineda

24.1. Introduction ............................................................................. 321

24.2. General Framework of Preliminary Examinations ..................... 323
    24.2.1. Observations on Preliminary Examinations................. 328
         24.2.1.1. Preliminary Examinations Apply Equally
                     to All Triggering Mechanisms .................... 329
         24.2.1.2. Preliminary Examinations Do Not
                     Constitute Investigations .......................... 330
         24.2.1.3. The Main Function of Preliminary
                     Examinations Is to Determine Whether or
                     Not a Reasonable Basis Exists to Proceed
                     with an Investigation .................................... 333

24.3. Practices on Publicising Past and Present Situations ............ 337

24.4. Reasons for Publicising Preliminary Examination Activities.... 353
    24.4.1. Manifest Reasons .......................................................... 354
         24.4.1.1. Transparency .................................................. 354
         24.4.1.2. Raising Public Awareness ............................... 357
    24.4.2. Secondary Reasons ........................................................ 363
         24.4.2.1. To Counter Claims of Geographical
                     Imbalance ...................................................... 363
         24.4.2.2. Perception of Productivity ............................... 367

24.5. Consequences of Publicising Preliminary Examination
    Activities ...................................................................................... 370
    24.5.1. Positive Consequences .................................................. 370
         24.5.1.1. Prevention and Deterrence ............................... 371
         24.5.1.2. Positive Complementarity .................................. 374
    24.5.2. Negative Consequences .................................................. 377
         24.5.2.1. Withdrawals ....................................................... 377
         24.5.2.2. Undermining Future Investigations .................... 382
24.6. Practical Recommendations to Enhance and Improve Public Communications of the OTP during Preliminary Examinations ................................................................. 384
24.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 391

25. Objectivity of the ICC Preliminary Examinations .................................................. 395

By Vladimir Tochilovsky
25.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 395
25.2. Two Categories of Situations ............................................................................. 396
25.3. Risk of Manipulation ............................................................................................ 397
  25.3.1. Acceptance of Jurisdiction and Self-referrals ....... 398
  25.3.2. Publicity of the Preliminary Examination Reports ...... 400
25.4. Prosecutor’s Policy and Nexus to Investigation .............................................. 401
25.5. Safeguarding Objectivity of the Preliminary Examination ...... 404
  25.5.1. Sources of Information .............................................................................. 404
  25.5.2. On-site Visits ............................................................................................ 407
  25.5.3. Role of Experts in National Investigations ..................... 408
25.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 409

26. The ICC’s Interplay with UN Fact-Finding Commissions in Preliminary Examinations ........................................................................................................ 411

By Mutoy Mubiala
26.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 411
26.2. Interaction between the ICC-OTP and UNFFCs in Preliminary Examination ................................................................. 411
  26.2.1. Legal and Institutional Framework of the Co-operation between the ICC and the UN ........................................................................... 412
  26.2.2. Case Studies ................................................................................................. 414
    26.2.2.1. Darfur .................................................................................................... 415
    26.2.2.2. Libya ..................................................................................................... 416
    26.2.2.3. Central African Republic II ................................................................. 418
  26.3. Quality Control in the Relationship between the ICC-OTP and UNFFCs in Preliminary Examination ................................................................................................. 420
    26.3.1. Preliminary Examination between Fact-Finding and the Review by Pre-Trial Chambers ................................................................. 421
    26.3.2. The ‘Justiciability’ of the Information Provided by the UNFFCs ................. 425
      26.3.2.1. Kenya ................................................................................................. 425
      26.3.2.2. Côte d’Ivoire ..................................................................................... 429
      26.3.2.3. Issues relating to the Judicial Use of UNFFCs’ Information by the ICC ... 432
26.3.3. The ‘Criminalisation’ of the UNFFCs’ Methods of Work ................................................. 433
26.3.3.1. The Extension of UNFFCs’ Subject Matter to International Criminal Law ................. 433
26.3.3.2. Quality Control in UN Fact-Finding in Relation to Criminal Justice ...................... 435
26.4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 440

27. Non-States Parties and the Preliminary Examination of Article 12(3) Declarations .......................................................... 441

By LING Yan

27.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 441
27.1.1. The Preliminary Examination of Situations ............................................................ 441
27.1.2. Declarations under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute .. 442
27.1.3. Declarations Lodged by Non-States Parties Accepting the Jurisdiction of the ICC .......... 444
27.1.3.1. Uganda ................................................. 444
27.1.3.2. Côte d’Ivoire.......................................... 444
27.1.3.3. Palestine .................................................. 445
27.1.3.4. Ukraine .................................................... 447
27.1.3.5. Egypt ......................................................... 448
27.1.4. Purposes of Article 12(3) Declarations ................................................................. 448

27.2. Procedure Applicable to Article 12(3) Declarations in the Preliminary Examination Stage .................................................. 451
27.2.1. Applying the Same Procedure to Article 12(3) Declarations as the Procedure Applied to the Prosecutor’s Proprio Motu Proceedings ........................................... 451
27.2.2. Application of the Procedure to Article 12(3) Declarations and Its Consequence ............ 454
27.2.2.1. The Procedure Applied to Article 12(3) Declarations ............................................. 454
27.2.2.2. Lack of Judicial Oversight as a Consequence of the Application ......................... 455
27.2.2.3. Lack of Time Limits ............................................................................................ 457

27.3. Determination of the Validity of Article 12(3) Declarations .... 459
27.3.1. Authority to Determine Whether Palestine is Qualified as a State Capable to Make a Declaration..... 459
27.3.2. Authority to Determine a Government of a State ........... 463
27.3.3. Representative to Sign the Declaration on Behalf of the State ...................................... 465

27.4. Conclusion and Suggestions ......................................................................................... 467

By Dov Jacobs and Jennifer Naouri

28.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 469

28.2. Quality Control of the Preliminary Examination Phase: Some Basic Groundings ........................................... 472

28.2.1. The Nature of a Preliminary Examination ...................................................... 472

28.2.1.1. The Legal Nature of a Preliminary Examination ........................................ 472

28.2.1.2. The ‘Investigative’ Nature of a Preliminary Examination ............................ 474

28.2.2. The Temporal Dimension of Quality Control ............................................. 477

28.2.3. Quality Control of the Preliminary Examination Phase: A Question of Perspective ........................................... 477

28.3. Jurisdiction and the Potential Defendant ....................................................... 480

28.3.1. Identifying a Potential Perpetrator during Preliminary Examination (from a Practical Perspective) .................. 481

28.3.2. Current ICC/OTP Practice ............................................................................. 483

28.3.3. Assessment of the OTP Practice ................................................................. 486

28.4. Admissibility and the Potential Defendant ..................................................... 489

28.4.1. Identifying alleged perpetrators when assessing complementarity. ..................... 489

28.4.1.1. OTP Policy ............................................................................................... 489

28.4.1.2. OTP Practice ............................................................................................ 492

28.4.1.3. ICC Case Law .......................................................................................... 495

28.4.2. Assessing Gravity ......................................................................................... 496

28.4.3. Critical Evaluation ......................................................................................... 501

28.4.3.1. Is a Determination of Admissibility a Legal Requirement during a Preliminary Examination? ........................................... 501

28.4.3.2. Does a Discussion of Admissibility Have Any Practical Merit during a Preliminary Examination? ........................................... 503

28.5. The Status of the ‘Accused’ during a Preliminary Examination ........................................... 503
28.5.1. The Importance of Taking into Account the Potential Defendant during the Preliminary Examination .......... 504
28.5.2. The Applicability and Scope of Article 55 during the Preliminary Examination ............................................. 506
28.5.3. A New Formal Status for Potential Defendants? ........ 510
28.5.4. Illustrating Differences in Approach: The Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon Situations ............................................. 514
28.5.4.1. The Côte d’Ivoire Situation: Targeting an Individual with No Communication ....................... 514
28.5.4.2. The Gabon Situation: An Indication of Future Policy of the OTP towards a Potential Perpetrator? ............................................. 516
28.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 518

29. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of Civil Society Submissions ......................................................... 521

By Andreas Schüller and Chantal Meloni

29.1. Quality Control at the Preliminary Examination Stage: The Role of Civil Society Submissions and Practice at the Domestic Level in Germany ......................................................... 522
29.1.1. The Role of Civil Society in Developing Criminal Complaints: From Fact-finding to Submissions Triggering Preliminary Examinations ............................................. 523
29.1.2. Preliminary Examinations in Germany and the Role of Civil Society Submissions ............................................. 526
29.1.2.1. Selection Criteria in Universal Jurisdiction Cases .................................................................................. 527
29.1.2.2. Duration of Preliminary Examinations ............ 530
29.1.2.3. Transparency and Public Outreach .................. 531
29.1.2.4. Limited Rights of Victims to Appeal a Decision .................................................................................. 532
29.1.3. Conclusions on Quality Control of Preliminary Examinations in Germany through Civil Society Submissions ........................................................................................................ 533

29.2. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination: Civil Society Submissions at the International Criminal Court. 534
29.2.1. A Preliminary Observation ............................................. 537
29.2.2. Can CSOs and Victims Effectively Participate and Counter-balance Prosecutorial Discretion before the Opening of an Investigation? ............................................. 541
29.2.2.1. The Submission of Communications ............ 542
29.2.2.2. Representations during Authorization to Open an Investigation ........................................... 543
29.2.2.3. Intervention during the Judicial Review of the Decision Not to Open an Investigation ... 544
29.2.2.4. Lack of Powers with Regard to a Decision Not to Open an Investigation Based on Article 15(6) ................................................. 546
29.2.3. Challenging the Prosecutor’s Failure to Open Investigations in the absence of a Decision Not to Open an Investigation ........................................ 547
29.2.4. Conclusions on Preliminary Examinations before the ICC ........................................................................................................... 549

30. Civil Society Participation in Preliminary Examinations ................. 553
   By Sarah Williams
30.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 553
30.2. Civil Society, Preliminary Examinations and Article 15 Communications ................................................................................................. 556
   30.2.1. The Nature of Preliminary Examinations and the Role of Article 15 Communications .......................................................... 556
   30.2.2. Do Article 15 Communications Influence the Prosecutor? ......................................................... 558
   30.2.3. Quality of Article 15 Communications and Standard of Review ......................................................... 563
   30.2.4. What is the Aim of Article 15 Communications? ........................................ 566
   30.2.5. The Absence of Standing for Judicial Review in Preliminary Examinations ........................................ 569
30.3. The Amicus Curiae and the Potential to Influence and Regulate Prosecutorial Discretion ............... 575
   30.3.1. The Amicus Curiae .................................................................................................. 575
   30.3.2. Using the Amicus Curiae Mechanism to Influence the Prosecutor? ......................................................... 576
30.4. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 584
PART 5
THEMATICITY IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

31. Quality Control in Preliminary Examination of Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in International Criminal Law: A Feminist Analysis

By Usha Tandon, Pratibha Tandon and Shreyash U. Lalit

31.1. Introduction

31.2. Understanding the Feminist Perspective in Sexual Violence

31.2.1. Reasons for Targeting Women

31.2.2. Health Impairments of Sexualized Violence

31.2.3. Effects of Gendered Stigma

31.3. Feminist Engagements with the Rome Statute

31.4. Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations

31.4.1. Initiation of Preliminary Examinations

31.4.2. Jurisdiction

31.4.3. Admissibility

31.4.3.1. Complementarity

31.4.3.2. Gravity

31.4.4. Interests of Justice

31.4.5. The Lack of Concrete Time Frame

31.5. OTP Policy Papers


31.5.2. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 2014

31.5.3. Feminist Dimensions of the Policy Papers

31.6. Current Status of Preliminary Examinations vis-à-vis Sexual Offences

31.6.1. Ongoing Preliminary Examinations

31.6.2. Completed with Decision to Investigate

31.6.3. Closed with Decision Not to Investigate

31.7. Conclusion


By Cynthia Chamberlain

32.1. Introduction

32.2. The Prosecutor’s Policy on Children

32.3. The Relevant Legal Framework
32.4. Quality of Communications ...................................................... 639
32.5. Analysing the Article 53 Test from a Children’s Rights Perspective .................................................. 643
  32.5.1. Gravity .................................................................................. 645
  32.5.2. Interests of Victims ............................................................. 646
  32.5.3. The Interests of Justice ....................................................... 650
32.6. Conclusions ........................................................................... 652

33. Casting a Larger Shadow: Premeditated Madness, the International Criminal Court, and Preliminary Examinations ................................................................. 655

By Mark Kersten

33.1. Introduction: Shadow Politics and the International Criminal Court .............................................................................. 655
  33.1.1. Overview ............................................................................... 658
33.2. An Orthodox Understanding of Preliminary Examinations ..... 659
33.3. Preliminary Examinations and Assumptions about the ICC’s Desired Impact and Interests .................................................. 663
33.4. A ‘Madman Theory’ of Preliminary Examinations .................. 668
  33.4.1. Nixon, Kissinger and ICC Preliminary Examination Strategies .............................................................................. 668
  33.4.2. Growing Older, Growing Bolder: The ICC and Preliminary Examinations .................................................. 670
33.5. Strategies in the Preliminary Examination ‘Toolbox’: Thinking through Drawbacks .................................................. 675
33.6. Conclusion: An Opportunity to Think of Preliminary Examinations Creatively .................................................. 679

34. Open Source Fact-Finding in Preliminary Examinations ............ 681

By Alexa Koenig, Felim McMahon, Nikita Mehandru and Shikha Silliman Bhattacharjee

34.1. Introduction .............................................................................. 681
34.2. The Rise of Open Source Investigations for Intelligence Gathering and Human Rights Monitoring .................................. 684
  34.2.1. Brief History of Open Source Intelligence: 1853 to Present .............................................................................. 685
  34.2.2. The Shifting Nature of the Internet: Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 .............................................................................. 691
34.3. The Use of Open Source Information to Advance Preliminary Examinations at the ICC .................................................. 695
34.3.1. Guiding principles ......................................................... 698
  34.3.1.1. Independence ................................................... 698
  34.3.1.2. Impartiality ................................................... 699
  34.3.1.3. Objectivity .................................................. 700
34.3.2. Statutory Factors .................................................... 701
  34.3.2.1. Phases 1 and 2: Jurisdiction ............................... 701
  34.3.2.2. Phase 3: Admissibility ................................... 705
  34.3.2.3. Phase 4 .................................................... 708
34.3.3. Policy Considerations ............................................ 709
34.4. Conclusion ..................................................................... 710

35. ICC Preliminary Examinations and National Justice: Opportunities and Challenges for Catalysing Domestic Prosecutions. 711

By Elizabeth M. Evenson

35.1. Overview of the Preliminary Examination Process ............ 713
35.2. Overcoming Inability and Unwillingness through Positive Complementarity ................................................. 716
35.3. OTP’s Approach to Encouraging National Proceedings in Preliminary Examinations ........................................ 721
35.4. Key Challenges ............................................................. 722
  35.4.1. Context Matters .................................................... 722
  35.4.2. Importance of Strategic Alliances ............................ 723
  35.4.3. Passive v. Active Effects ........................................ 723
  35.4.4. Effects of the ICC’s Admissibility Regime and OTP’s Prosecutorial Policies ............................................. 724
  35.4.5. Absence of Timelines ............................................. 726
  35.4.6. Maintaining Leverage and the Use of Publicity ........... 727
  35.4.7. Limited Resources ................................................ 729

Index .......................................................................................... 731

TOAEP Team .................................................................................. 741

Other Volumes in the Publication Series .................................. 743