

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Foreword by Judge LIU Daqun</i> .....	<i>i</i>
<i>Foreword by Ambassador Martin Sørby</i> .....	<i>v</i>

1. On the Magic, Mystery and Mayhem of Preliminary Examinations .....	1
<i>By Carsten Stahn, Morten Bergsmo and CHAN Ho Shing Icarus</i>	
1.1. The Quality Control Project .....	1
1.2. Preliminary Examinations at the International Criminal Court ....	4
1.3. Functions, Meanings and Messages of Preliminary Examinations .....	6
1.4. Prosecutorial Managerialism .....	9
1.5. Discretion .....	14
1.6. Re-visiting Methodologies .....	18
1.7. Contents of the Following Chapters .....	21
1.8. Not a Conclusion .....	32

### PART 1

#### THE PRACTICE OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: REALITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

2. Constraints and Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Critical Lessons Learned from the ICTY, the ICC, the ECCC and the United Kingdom.....	35
<i>By Andrew T. Cayley</i>	
2.1. Pre-Investigative Activity at the ICTY .....	36
2.2. The Creation of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and Pre-Investigative Activities at the ECCC .....	41
2.3. Pre-Investigative Activities and Complementarity in the United Kingdom in Relation to the Iraq/UK Preliminary Examination ..	50
2.4. Conclusions .....	61

3.	The Concern for Quality Control and Norwegian Preliminary Examination Practice .....	65
	<i>By Runar Torgersen</i>	
3.1.	Introduction .....	65
3.2.	The Distinction between Preliminary Examination and Investigation in Norwegian Law .....	65
3.3.	The Scope of Preliminary Examinations in Norwegian Law in Different Types of Cases.....	68
3.4.	Quality Concerns in Preliminary Examinations .....	69
3.4.1.	'Quality' in Criminal Procedure.....	69
3.4.2.	Lack of Regulation as a Cause of Concern in Preliminary Examinations.....	70
3.4.2.1.	Seeking Information in Favour of a Suspect ...	71
3.4.2.2.	Specification of the Suspicion .....	71
3.4.2.3.	Notification and Access to Information.....	71
3.4.2.4.	Right to Refute the Allegations and to Offer Additional Information.....	71
3.4.2.5.	Right to Demand Further Inquiries and Access to Court .....	71
3.4.2.6.	Speedy Inquiries .....	72
3.5.	Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations .....	72
4.	Preliminary Examination in the United States Military: Quality Control and Reform .....	75
	<i>By Franklin D. Rosenblatt</i>	
4.1.	Introduction .....	75
4.2.	Non-Judicial Mechanisms of Military Preliminary Examination	77
4.3.	Judicial Mechanisms of Military Preliminary Examination .....	83
4.4.	The Necessity to Conduct Preliminary Examination On-Scene ..	88
4.5.	Enhancing a Culture of Quality Control for Military Preliminary Examination .....	94
4.6.	Conclusion .....	99
5.	Pre-Investigation and Accountability in India: Legal and Policy Roadblocks.....	101
	<i>By Abraham Joseph</i>	
5.1.	Introduction .....	103
5.2.	India and Core International Crimes.....	104
5.2.1.	India's Objection to the International Criminal Court ..	105
5.2.2.	India's Approach to International Law Obligations.....	106
5.2.2.1.	Nellie Massacre (1983) .....	106

5.2.2.2.	Anti-Sikh Riots (1984) .....	107
5.2.2.3.	Hashimpura Killings (1987) .....	112
5.2.2.4.	Mass Crimes in Gujarat: Godhra and its Aftermath .....	112
5.2.2.5.	Violence in Orissa against Christians .....	115
5.2.3.	Conclusion .....	117
5.3.	Pre-Investigation/Investigation in Indian Criminal Procedural Law .....	118
5.3.1.	The Pre-Investigative/Investigative Framework in India .....	118
5.3.2.	Police in India .....	119
5.4.	Suggestions and Conclusions .....	124
6.	German Preliminary Examinations of International Crimes .....	127
	<i>By Matthias Neuner</i>	
6.1.	Germany's Implementation of the ICC Statute .....	127
6.1.1.	Competent Court .....	128
6.1.2.	Federal Prosecutor General .....	129
6.2.	Objectives of Implementation and Preliminary Examinations ..	130
6.2.1.	Implementation .....	131
6.2.2.	Preliminary Examination .....	131
6.2.2.1.	Primary Inferences from Law .....	131
6.2.2.2.	Secondary Inferences from Indirectly Applicable Law and Practice .....	133
6.2.2.3.	Conclusion .....	136
6.3.	Measures Available during Preliminary Examinations .....	137
6.3.1.	Measures Infringing Human Rights .....	137
6.3.2.	Overview of Means Available during Preliminary Examination .....	137
6.3.2.1.	Open Source Analysis/Monitoring .....	138
6.3.2.2.	Informal/Informative Questioning .....	138
6.3.2.3.	Request Available Data from Other State Authorities .....	139
6.4.	Preliminary Examination in Practice .....	142
6.4.1.	Preliminary Examinations without Further Investigations .....	142
6.4.1.1.	JIANG Zemin <i>et al.</i> (People's Republic of China) .....	142
6.4.1.2.	Ramzan Kadyrov (Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation) .....	145
6.4.1.3.	Almatov, Inoyatov <i>et al.</i> (Uzbekistan) .....	146

6.4.1.4.	Donald Henry Rumsfeld <i>et al.</i> (Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq).....	150
6.4.2.	Preliminary Examinations Leading to Formal Investigations (And Their Subsequent Closing) .....	156
6.4.2.1.	Against Unknown Persons (Drone Strike in Pakistan).....	156
6.4.2.2.	Colonel Klein <i>et al.</i> (Aerial Bombardment near Kunduz/Afghanistan) .....	158
6.4.3.	Common Arguments Advanced in Decisions on Preliminary Examinations.....	161
6.4.3.1.	No Specific Link of the Alleged Perpetrator to Germany .....	162
6.4.3.2.	Preventive Judicial Assistance.....	165
6.4.3.3.	Subsidiarity.....	168
6.4.3.4.	Immunity .....	170
6.5.	Quality Control of Preliminary Examinations .....	173
6.6.	Conclusion .....	176
7.	The Legalistic Function of Preliminary Examinations: Quality Control as a Two-Way Street .....	179
	<i>By Matilde E. Gawronski</i>	
7.1.	Introduction .....	179
7.2.	Preliminary Examinations as a Legalistic Process .....	181
7.2.1.	The Legalistic Nature of Preliminary Examinations....	181
7.3.	The Preliminary Examination Work Process in Brief.....	185
7.3.1.	Phase 1 .....	186
7.3.2.	Phase 2: Jurisdiction .....	187
7.3.3.	Phase 3: Admissibility .....	190
7.3.4.	Phase 4: Interests of Justice .....	192
7.3.5.	Article 53(1) Report.....	194
7.4.	The Concepts of ‘Quality’ and ‘Quality Control’ in the Context of Preliminary Examinations .....	195
7.4.1.	Quality and Preliminary Examinations: A View from the OTP .....	195
7.4.2.	Internal Quality Control and External Quality Enhancement.....	198
7.5.	Quality Control and Enhancement in the Preliminary Examination Process.....	200

7.5.1.	Quality Control in Phase 1.....	201
7.5.2.	Quality Control in the Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Assessment of Phase 2.....	203
7.5.3.	Quality Control in the Complementarity Assessment of Phase 3.....	209
7.5.4.	Quality Control in the Interests of Justice Assessment of Phase 4.....	214
7.6.	Conclusions .....	220
8.	<b>The Pre-Preliminary Examination Stage: Theory and Practice of the OTP's Phase 1 Activities .....</b>	223
	<i>By Amitis Khojasteh</i>	
8.1.	Introduction .....	223
8.2.	Overview of the Phase 1 Process.....	227
8.2.1.	Initial Basic Filtering .....	228
8.2.2.	Analysis of 'Warrant Further Analysis' Communications.....	229
8.2.2.1.	Applicable Standard at Phase 1 .....	230
8.2.2.2.	Scope and Nature of the Analysis .....	232
8.2.2.3.	Internal Review and Timelines.....	237
8.3.	Prosecutorial Discretion at Phase 1 .....	238
8.4.	Transparency in and Publicity of Phase 1 Activities .....	241
8.5.	Quality Control in Phase 1 .....	248
8.6.	Conclusion.....	252
 <b>PART 2</b>		
<b>CASE STUDIES OR SITUATION ANALYSIS</b>		
9.	<b>The ICC Involvement in Colombia: Walking the Fine Line between Peace and Justice .....</b>	257
	<i>By Marina Aksanova</i>	
9.1.	Introduction .....	257
9.2.	The Dialogical Model of the ICC Involvement in Colombia ....	263
9.3.	Compatibility of Standards .....	274
9.3.1.	New Vision of Justice – Less Retribution, More Reparations .....	274
9.3.2.	Prioritization .....	275
9.3.3.	Penalties.....	277
9.3.4.	Command Responsibility.....	279
9.4.	Conclusion.....	281

10.	'Magical Legalism' and the International Criminal Court: A Case Study of the Kenyan Preliminary Examination .....	283
	<i>By Christian M. De Vos</i>	
10.1.	Introduction .....	283
10.2.	Preliminary Examinations and the OTP .....	288
10.2.1.	Legal Framework .....	288
10.2.2.	Relationship to Complementarity .....	293
10.3.	The ICC's Preliminary Examination in Kenya .....	296
10.3.1.	The Waki Commission and the ICC: January–October 2008 .....	298
10.3.2.	Special Tribunal for Kenya: October 2008–February 2009 .....	300
10.3.3.	Subsequent Efforts: March–November 2009.....	304
10.4.	The Kenyan Examination Reconsidered .....	306
10.4.1.	Understanding of Domestic Political Context .....	306
10.4.2.	Overconfident and Underprepared.....	308
10.4.3.	A Complementarity Conundrum.....	310
10.5.	Conclusion .....	312
11.	Challenges in the Relationship between the ICC and African States: The Role of Preliminary Examinations under the First ICC Prosecutor .....	317
	<i>By Benson Chinedu Olugbwo</i>	
11.1.	Introduction .....	318
11.1.1.	The Prosecutor of the ICC .....	322
11.2.	The Theory of Prosecutorial Neutrality .....	325
11.2.1.	Prosecutorial Neutrality: Convergence of Domestic and International Criminal Law Systems.....	327
11.3.	Prosecutorial Discretion and Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations .....	331
11.3.1.	General Principles of Prosecutorial Discretion during Preliminary Examinations.....	332
11.3.1.1.	Independence during Preliminary Examinations .....	332
11.3.1.2.	Impartiality during Preliminary Examinations .....	334
11.3.1.3.	Objectivity during Preliminary Examinations .....	334

11.3.2. Prosecutorial Discretion and Policy Objectives	
Guiding Preliminary Examinations .....	335
11.3.2.1. Transparency during Preliminary	
Examinations.....	335
11.3.2.2. Ending Impunity through Positive	
Complementarity during Preliminary	
Examinations.....	336
11.3.2.3. Prevention of International Crimes during	
Preliminary Examinations .....	337
11.4. Preliminary Examinations and Referral of Situations to the	
Court.....	339
11.4.1. Referral of a Situation by a State Party.....	339
11.4.2. Initiation of an Investigation by the Prosecutor.....	341
11.4.3. Referral by the UNSC.....	343
11.4.4. Referrals and Prosecutorial Discretion during	
Preliminary Examinations .....	344
11.4.5. Admissibility and Prosecutorial Discretion .....	345
11.5. Prosecutorial Neutrality and Case Studies of Preliminary	
Examinations Conducted in Africa.....	347
11.5.1. Neutrality as Non-biased Decision-making .....	347
11.5.2. Neutrality as Non-partisan Decision-making .....	349
11.5.3. Neutrality as Principled Decision-making .....	351
11.5.4. Uganda and Central African Republic .....	355
11.5.5. Sudan and Libya .....	357
11.5.6. Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire.....	358
11.6. The Exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor in Preliminary	
Examinations in Six African Countries – Key Findings.....	359
11.6.1. The Significance of the Theory of Prosecutorial	
Neutrality .....	363
11.6.2. Formal Independence of the ICC Prosecutor.....	364
11.6.3. Legal Basis for Prosecutorial Discretion for	
Preliminary Examinations and Guidance .....	364
11.6.4. Accountability Mechanisms Regulating the	
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion .....	365
11.7. Conclusion.....	366
12. Dealing with the Ongoing Conflict at the Heart of Europe:	
On the ICC Prosecutor’s Difficult Choices and Challenges in the	
Preliminary Examination into the Situation of Ukraine.....	371
<i>By Iryna Marchuk</i>	
12.1. Introduction .....	371
12.2. Background.....	373

12.3.	Uneasy Relationship between Ukraine and the ICC: Constitutional Conundrum .....	376
12.4.	The ICC Prosecutor's Preliminary Examination into the Maydan Crimes (Declaration I) .....	379
12.5.	The ICC Prosecutor's Preliminary Examination into the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Declaration II) .....	387
12.5.1.	International, Non-International or Hybrid Armed Conflict in Ukraine?.....	389
12.5.2.	No Prospects of Justice in Eastern Ukraine without the ICC Prosecutor's Involvement? .....	391
12.5.3.	The ICC Prosecutor's Access to Evidence and Co-operation with National Authorities in Ukraine.....	393
12.6.	What's Next? Will the ICC Prosecutor Move Forward with an Investigation?.....	395
13.	Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq? Examining the Nexus between International and National Justice Responses .....	399
	<i>By Thomas Obel Hansen</i>	
13.1.	Introduction .....	399
13.2.	Preliminary Examinations and Positive Complementarity .....	402
13.2.1.	Assumptions about the Connection between Preliminary Examinations and Positive Complementarity .....	402
13.2.2.	Lack of Empirical Support and Conceptual Clarity concerning Positive Complementarity .....	404
13.2.3.	OTP Standards Relating to Positive Complementarity at the Preliminary Examination Phase .....	408
13.3.	The Iraq/UK Preliminary Examination: Status and Crimes under Scrutiny.....	410
13.3.1.	Closing and Re-opening of the Iraq/UK Examination and Broader Context .....	410
13.3.2.	The Alleged Crimes .....	415
13.4.	The OTP's Strategies, Expectations to Domestic Accountability Processes and Engagement with Other Actors..	420
13.4.1.	Best Case Scenario and Challenges to Positive Complementarity .....	420
13.4.2.	Key Factors in the Complementarity Assessment .....	422
13.4.3.	OTP Engagement with Other Stakeholders .....	425
13.4.4.	Is the OTP Treating the Iraq/UK Examination Differently from Other Preliminary Examinations? .....	428
13.5.	UK Government Responses to the Preliminary Examination ...	429

13.5.1.	Overall Responses to the ICC's Re-opening of the Preliminary Examination .....	429
13.5.2.	Judicial Processes in the UK Addressing Crimes in Iraq and their Connections to the Preliminary Examination.....	432
13.5.3.	The Establishment and Closure of IHAT .....	435
13.5.4.	How the Fall of PIL Became IHAT's Fall – Will it Become the Preliminary Examination's Fall Too? .....	442
13.5.5.	The Road Ahead for Accountability in the UK.....	445
13.6.	Conclusions .....	448
14.	<b>The UK in Iraq and the ICC: Judicial Intervention, Positive Complementarity and the Politics of International Criminal Justice.....</b>	451
	<i>By Rachel Kerr</i>	
14.1.	Introduction .....	452
14.2.	The Iraq War.....	455
14.3.	War Crimes .....	458
14.4.	Trials and Tribulations.....	460
14.4.1.	Prosecutions.....	460
14.4.2.	Inquiries .....	465
14.4.3.	IHAT and the Iraqi Civilians Litigation.....	468
14.4.4.	The ICC's Preliminary Examination .....	475
14.5.	The Fallout: Law(yers), Politics and War (Crimes).....	480
	Appendix 1: Amnesty Report (2004).....	486
	Appendix 2: Courts Martial .....	487
	Appendix 3: Judicial Review Cases.....	488
15.	<b>The Situation of Palestine in Wonderland: An Investigation into the ICC's Impact in Israel .....</b>	493
	<i>By Sharon Weill</i>	
15.1.	Introduction .....	493
15.2.	On Deterrence: The Saga of the Settlement Regulation Law ....	494
15.2.1.	The Legislative Process and ICC Appearance .....	496
15.3.	The (Unintended) Impact on NGOs .....	500
15.3.1.	The Shrinking Space.....	500
15.3.2.	De-legitimization and Personal Attacks.....	500
15.4.	Economic Pressure and Its Limits .....	502
15.5.	The ICC in the Israeli Press.....	504
15.6.	Positive Complementarity? .....	507

15.6.1. From the Duty to Investigate and Prosecute to the Duty to Examine and Re-examine .....	509
15.6.1.1. Criminal Investigation.....	509
15.6.1.2. Effective Investigation.....	509
15.6.1.3. Examination .....	510
15.6.1.4. Israeli Narratives for Closing Examination ...	511
15.6.2. Main Structural Deficiencies .....	513
15.6.2.1. Independency and Impartiality .....	513
15.6.2.2. Civilian Supervision and the Israeli High Court of Justice: From Abstention to Deference.....	514
15.7. Conclusion.....	518
16. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of the Georgia Situation .....	521
<i>By Nino Tsereteli</i>	
16.1. Introduction .....	521
16.2. Unpacking the Notion of ‘Quality Control’ .....	523
16.2.1. Defining ‘Quality’ .....	523
16.2.2. Defining ‘Control’ .....	527
16.2.2.1. Rationale of Control .....	527
16.2.2.2. The Meaning of Control .....	528
16.2.2.3. Types of Control: Political, Social, Judicial ..	529
16.2.2.4. Transparency and Control .....	533
16.3. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of the Georgian Situation .....	536
16.3.1. Political Control.....	536
16.3.2. Social Control .....	541
16.3.3. Reflections on Political and Social Control and their Interplay .....	543
16.3.4. Prosecutor’s Response to Competing Social and Political Pressures .....	544
16.3.5. Judicial Control.....	547
16.3.5.1. Major Disagreements in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision .....	548
16.3.5.2. Reflections on the Quality of Judicial Control.....	550
16.3.6. Transparency and Control in the Georgian Preliminary Examination .....	552
16.4. Concluding Remarks .....	553

17. The Venture of the Comoros Referral at the Preliminary Examination Stage .....	555
<i>By Ali Emrah Bozbayindir</i>	
17.1. Introduction .....	555
17.2. Procedural History.....	560
17.3. Factual Basis.....	564
17.3.1. The Importance of the Human Rights Council Report .	564
17.3.2. Interception of the Gaza Flotilla by the Israeli Navy and Its Aftermath: Factual Overview and a Summary of the Cases.....	565
17.3.2.1. Events aboard the <i>Mavi Marmara</i> .....	566
17.3.2.2. Events aboard the <i>Eleftheri Mesogios</i> and the <i>Rachel Corrie</i> .....	576
17.4. Preliminary Legal Issues .....	576
17.4.1. Legal Characterization of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict .....	577
17.4.2. The International Law of Naval Blockade and the Question of the Legality of the Israeli Blockade on Gaza and the Legality of Israeli Attack on the Gaza Flotilla.....	584
17.5. Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court.....	602
17.5.1. War Crimes .....	603
17.5.1.1. Wilful Killing (Article 8(2)(a)(i)).....	610
17.5.1.2. Torture or Inhuman Treatment (Article 8(2)(a)(ii)) .....	610
17.5.1.3. Wilfully Causing Great Suffering (Article 8(2)(a)(iii)) .....	612
17.5.1.4. Extensive Destruction and Appropriation of Property, Not Justified by Military Necessity and Carried out Unlawfully and Wantonly (Article 8(2)(a)(iv)) .....	613
17.5.1.5. Acts of Unlawful Deportation or Transfer or Unlawful Confinement (Article 8(2)(a)(vii)) .....	613
17.5.1.6. Intentionally Directing Attacks against the Civilian Population as Such or against Individual Civilians Not Taking Direct Part in Hostilities (Article 8(2)(b)(i)) .....	614
17.5.1.7. Intentionally Directing Attacks against Civilian Objects (Article 8(2)(b)(ii)).....	614

17.5.1.8. Intentionally Directing Attacks against Personnel, Installations, Material, Units or Vehicles Involved in a Humanitarian Assistance or Peacekeeping Mission in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as Long as They Are Entitled to the Protection Given to Civilians or Civilian Objects under the International Law of Armed Conflict (Article 8(2)(b)(iii)).....	615
17.5.1.9. Pillaging a Town or Place, Even When Taken by Assault (Article 8(2)(b)(xvi)).....	618
17.5.1.10. Committing Outrages upon Personal Dignity, in Particular Humiliating and Degrading Treatment (Article 8(2)(b)(xxi)) ..	618
17.5.1.11. Conclusion.....	619
17.5.2. Crimes against Humanity.....	619
17.6. Main Issues .....	623
17.6.1. Methodology: The Relationship with Other Fact-Finders .....	623
17.6.2. Analysis of the Prosecutor's and Pre-Trial Chamber I's Gravity Assessments .....	631
17.6.3. Prosecutorial Discretion and Judicial Review .....	650
17.6.3.1. Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision .....	651
17.6.3.2. The Appeals Chamber .....	654
17.7. The Turkish-Israeli Agreement: An Amnesty? .....	660
17.8. Concluding Remarks .....	664
17.9. Postscript .....	668
 Index .....	671
TOAEP Team.....	681
Other Volumes in the Publication Series .....	683

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Editors' Foreword to Volume 2 .....</i>	<i>i</i>
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### PART 3

#### THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS

18. Prosecutorial Ethics and Preliminary Examinations at the ICC .....	1
<i>By Alexander Heinze and Shannon Fyfe</i>	
18.1. Introduction .....	1
18.2. Prosecutorial Ethics .....	3
18.2.1. The Relationship between Law and Morality.....	3
18.2.2. Justice and Fair Trials .....	6
18.2.3. Normative Foundations for Specific Prosecutorial Duties.....	8
18.3. Prosecutorial Ethics in International Criminal Law .....	13
18.3.1. <i>Ius Puniendi</i> and Purpose of Punishment in International Criminal Law .....	14
18.3.2. Ethics and International Criminal Law .....	20
18.3.2.1. Normative Moral Foundations for International Criminal Law .....	20
18.3.2.2. Universal Jurisdiction.....	24
18.3.2.3. Normative Moral Foundations for the ICC .....	25
18.3.3. Ethical Obligations for the OTP .....	26
18.3.3.1. General Ethical Rules.....	27
18.3.3.2. Accountability Mechanisms .....	36
18.4. Prosecutorial Discretion and Preliminary Examinations at the ICC .....	40
18.4.1. Legal Principles of Prosecutorial Discretion .....	40
18.4.2. Preliminary Examinations and Article 53(1) .....	45
18.4.3. Prosecutorial Discretion and the “Interests of Justice”... ..	49
18.4.3.1. The OTP and Article 53(1)(c) .....	49
18.4.3.2. Whose Justice? .....	51
18.4.3.3. Political Considerations and Article 53(1)(c).. ..	55
18.4.3.4. Deontological and Consequentialist Obligations under Article 53(1)(c) .....	59

18.4.4. Accountability Mechanisms and Judicial Review .....	61
18.5. Specific Recommendations for OTP Ethics in the Preliminary Examination Phase .....	63
18.5.1. Suggested Ethical Obligations .....	63
18.5.1.1. Revisions to the OTP's Policy Guidelines.....	63
18.5.1.2. Concretization of the OTP's General Ethic Rules (Especially its Code of Conduct).....	71
18.5.2. Suggested Internal Accountability Mechanisms .....	75
18.6. Conclusion .....	75
 19. Politics, Power Dynamics, and the Limits of Existing Self-Regulation and Oversight in ICC Preliminary Examinations .....	77
<i>By Asaf Lubin</i>	
19.1. Introduction .....	78
19.2. Normative Framework.....	84
19.2.1. Legislative Structures.....	84
19.2.2. Prosecutorial Independence and External Review .....	90
19.3. Existing Oversight Mechanisms .....	95
19.3.1. Self-Regulation ('Office Common Law').....	96
19.3.1.1. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations ...	100
19.3.1.2. Public Reporting on Preliminary Examinations .....	105
19.3.1.3. Termination of Preliminary Examinations Reports .....	106
19.3.1.4. Press Releases and Reporting to the UNSC and the ASP .....	109
19.3.2. Judicial Review by the PTC.....	110
19.3.2.1. Central African Republic.....	113
19.3.2.2. Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia .....	115
19.4. The Palestinian Preliminary Examination and the Limits of Existing Oversight Mechanisms .....	121
19.4.1. The Preliminary Examination on Palestine: Background.....	121
19.4.2. Politicization of the Court.....	125
19.4.3. Prioritization Policies and Exit Strategies.....	130
19.4.4. Evidentiary Standards at the Preliminary Examination Stage.....	136
19.5. Areas for Potential Reform.....	143

19.5.1. Re-phasing of the Preliminary Examination Phase .....	143
19.5.2. Redefining the Relationship between the OTP and the PTC.....	145
19.5.3. Redrafting Existing OTP Policy Papers and the Adoption of New Policies.....	146
19.5.4. External Review Processes .....	148
19.6. Conclusion.....	149
 20. Disarming the Trap: Evaluating Prosecutorial Discretion in Preliminary Examinations beyond the False Dichotomy of Politics and Law .....	151
<i>By Jens Iverson</i>	
20.1. Introduction .....	151
20.2. Defining the Trap: The Context of Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations .....	155
20.3. What is Quality in Quality Control?.....	161
20.4. Quality in Preliminary Examination as Potential Didactic Effect .....	162
20.5. Contrasting ‘Optimal’ and ‘Maximal’ Choices.....	164
20.6. Pragmatism and Didactics .....	172
20.7. A Pragmatic Approach to the Didactic Effect of Choices Made in Preliminary Examinations .....	174
20.8. Limitations to Using Criminal Proceedings as a Means to a Didactic End.....	175
20.9. Conclusions .....	178
 21. Make the ICC Relevant: Aiding, Abetting, and Accessorizing as Aggravating Factors in Preliminary Examination .....	181
<i>By Christopher B. Mahony</i>	
21.1. Introduction .....	181
21.1.1. Considering the ICC’s Deterrent Effect.....	183
21.2. Globalization, Liberalism and Proxy-War’s Enablement .....	186
21.2.1. Conflict’s Multi-dimensional Causes .....	187
21.2.2. Syria: A Permissive Global System’s Emblematic Proxy-War.....	189
21.2.3. How the Global System and Its Leadership Ignore Contemporary Conflicts .....	193
21.3. Prosecuting Aiding, Abetting and Accessorizing as a Response to Proxy War .....	195

21.3.1. Gravity in Preliminary Examination and the Aiding, Abetting and Accessorizing of Crimes.....	196
21.4. The Legal Threshold of Aiding, Abetting and Accessorizing,...	199
21.4.1. Aiding and Abetting under the Rome Statute .....	200
21.4.2. Accessorizing under the Rome Statute .....	204
21.5. Aiders, Abettors, and Accessories in Afghanistan .....	205
21.6. Conclusion .....	209
22. The Standard of Proof in Preliminary Examinations .....	213
<i>By Matthew E. Cross</i>	
22.1. Interpreting Article 53(1) of the Statute: Defining the Standard of Proof.....	217
22.1.1. Ordinary Meaning of the Term “Reasonable Basis to Believe” in Article 53(1).....	220
22.1.2. Context of the Standard of Proof in Article 53(1).....	224
22.1.3. Object and Purpose of the Statute and Article 53(1): A Selective Approach to Investigations .....	234
22.1.4. The Article 53(1) Standard of Proof: A Summary .....	238
22.2. The Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Article 53(1).....	238
22.3. Consequences of the Standard of Proof in Article 53(1) .....	243
22.3.1. A Duty to Evaluate the Available Information.....	244
22.3.2. Prohibitive Effect of Insufficient or Ambiguous Information .....	245
22.3.3. Selectivity in Publicly Reported Criminal Allegations in ‘Positively-resolved’ Preliminary Examinations .....	247
22.3.4. No <i>De Novo</i> Judicial Review .....	250
22.4. Conclusion .....	251
23. Reconceptualizing the Birth of the International Criminal Case: Creating an Office of the Examining Magistrate .....	255
<i>By Gregory S. Gordon</i>	
23.1. Introduction .....	255
23.2. The Preliminary Examination Process and Objectives .....	257
23.2.1. Preliminary Examination Triggers.....	258
23.2.1.1. Communications and Referrals .....	258
23.2.1.2. The Providers and Nature of Information Received .....	259
23.2.1.3. Procedural Presumptions .....	260
23.2.2. The Four Phases.....	260
23.2.2.1. Phase 1: Initial Assessment .....	260
23.2.2.2. Phase 2: Jurisdiction Assessment .....	261

23.2.2.3. Phase 3: Admissibility Assessment .....	263
23.2.2.4. Phase 4: Interests of Justice Assessment .....	264
23.2.3. Preliminary Examination Activities.....	265
23.2.4. Preliminary Examination Termination.....	267
23.2.5. Preliminary Examination Objectives.....	267
23.3. A Preliminary Examination Record of Timeline Inconsistency, Politicization and Uneven Results.....	268
23.3.1. Timeline Inconsistencies .....	268
23.3.1.1. Preliminary Examinations Triggered by Communications .....	268
23.3.1.2. Preliminary Examinations Triggered by Referrals .....	280
23.3.2. Politicization of Cases .....	282
23.3.2.1. Personality-Driven Politics .....	282
23.3.2.2. Situation-Driven Politics .....	284
23.3.2.3. Uneven Results.....	287
23.4. A Proposed Solution: Creation of the Office of the Examining Magistrate .....	289
23.4.1. Background.....	289
23.4.2. Foundations: The Civil Law Examining Magistrate and the ECCC's Office of Co-Investigating Judges ....	291
23.4.2.1. The Traditional Civil Law Examining Magistrate.....	291
23.4.2.2. The Internationalization of the Examining Magistrate: The Office of the Co-Investigating Judges at the ECCC .....	293
23.4.3. Integrating the Office of the Examining Magistrate into the ICC Preliminary Examination Framework.....	296
23.4.3.1. The Stages of the Process .....	296
23.4.3.2. Timeline Parameters.....	301
23.4.3.3. Other Logistical Considerations.....	303
23.5. Potential Advantages and Disadvantages to Integrating the OEM into the Existing Structure .....	305
23.5.1. An Analysis of Potential Advantages .....	305
23.5.1.1. Promoting Retributive Justice .....	305
23.5.1.2. Promoting Procedural Justice.....	306
23.5.1.3. Promoting Restorative Justice .....	308
23.5.2. An Analysis of Potential Disadvantages.....	309
23.5.2.1. Creating Unnecessary Rigidity.....	309
23.5.2.2. Restricting Prosecutorial Discretion.....	309
23.5.2.3. Ballooning Bureaucracy and Expenses .....	310

23.5.3. A Net Positive Assessment .....	311
23.5.3.1. In Reference to Potential Inflexibility and Restricted Prosecutorial Discretion .....	311
23.5.3.2. Bureaucracy and Budget .....	314
23.5.3.3. The Other Advantages Already Considered ..	314
23.6. Conclusion .....	315
 <b>PART 4</b>	
<b>TRANSPARENCY, CO-OPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION</b>	
24. Deterrence or Withdrawals?	
Consequences of Publicising Preliminary Examination Activities .....	321
<i>By Ana Cristina Rodríguez Pineda</i>	
24.1. Introduction .....	321
24.2. General Framework of Preliminary Examinations .....	323
24.2.1. Observations on Preliminary Examinations.....	328
24.2.1.1. Preliminary Examinations Apply Equally to All Triggering Mechanisms .....	329
24.2.1.2. Preliminary Examinations Do Not Constitute Investigations .....	330
24.2.1.3. The Main Function of Preliminary Examinations Is to Determine Whether or Not a <i>Reasonable Basis Exists</i> to Proceed with an Investigation .....	333
24.3. Practices on Publicising Past and Present Situations.....	337
24.4. Reasons for Publicising Preliminary Examination Activities....	353
24.4.1. Manifest Reasons.....	354
24.4.1.1. Transparency .....	354
24.4.1.2. Raising Public Awareness.....	357
24.4.2. Secondary Reasons .....	363
24.4.2.1. To Counter Claims of Geographical Imbalance .....	363
24.4.2.2. Perception of Productivity .....	367
24.5. Consequences of Publicising Preliminary Examination Activities.....	370
24.5.1. Positive Consequences.....	370
24.5.1.1. Prevention and Deterrence .....	371
24.5.1.2. Positive Complementarity .....	374
24.5.2. Negative Consequences .....	377
24.5.2.1. Withdrawals.....	377
24.5.2.2. Undermining Future Investigations .....	382

24.6.	Practical Recommendations to Enhance and Improve Public Communications of the OTP during Preliminary Examinations .....	384
24.7.	Conclusion.....	391
25.	Objectivity of the ICC Preliminary Examinations.....	395
	<i>By Vladimir Tochilovsky</i>	
25.1.	Introduction .....	395
25.2.	Two Categories of Situations.....	396
25.3.	Risk of Manipulation.....	397
25.3.1.	Acceptance of Jurisdiction and Self-referrals.....	398
25.3.2.	Publicity of the Preliminary Examination Reports .....	400
25.4.	Prosecutor's Policy and Nexus to Investigation .....	401
25.5.	Safeguarding Objectivity of the Preliminary Examination .....	404
25.5.1.	Sources of Information .....	404
25.5.2.	On-site Visits .....	407
25.5.3.	Role of Experts in National Investigations .....	408
25.6.	Conclusion.....	409
26.	The ICC's Interplay with UN Fact-Finding Commissions in Preliminary Examinations .....	411
	<i>By Mutoy Mubiala</i>	
26.1.	Introduction .....	411
26.2.	Interaction between the ICC-OTP and UNFFCs in Preliminary Examination.....	411
26.2.1.	Legal and Institutional Framework of the Co-operation between the ICC and the UN .....	412
26.2.2.	Case Studies.....	414
26.2.2.1.	Darfur .....	415
26.2.2.2.	Libya .....	416
26.2.2.3.	Central African Republic II .....	418
26.3.	Quality Control in the Relationship between the ICC-OTP and UNFFCs in Preliminary Examination .....	420
26.3.1.	Preliminary Examination between Fact-Finding and the Review by Pre-Trial Chambers.....	421
26.3.2.	The 'Justiciability' of the Information Provided by the UNFFCs.....	425
26.3.2.1.	Kenya .....	425
26.3.2.2.	Côte d'Ivoire .....	429
26.3.2.3.	Issues relating to the Judicial Use of UNFFCs' Information by the ICC.....	432

26.3.3. The ‘Criminalisation’ of the UNFFCs’ Methods of Work.....	433
26.3.3.1. The Extension of UNFFCs’ Subject Matter to International Criminal Law .....	433
26.3.3.2. Quality Control in UN Fact-Finding in Relation to Criminal Justice .....	435
26.4. Conclusion .....	440
27. Non-States Parties and the Preliminary Examination of Article 12(3) Declarations .....	441
<i>By LING Yan</i>	
27.1. Introduction .....	441
27.1.1. The Preliminary Examination of Situations.....	441
27.1.2. Declarations under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute ..	442
27.1.3. Declarations Lodged by Non-States Parties Accepting the Jurisdiction of the ICC .....	444
27.1.3.1. Uganda .....	444
27.1.3.2. Côte d’Ivoire.....	444
27.1.3.3. Palestine .....	445
27.1.3.4. Ukraine .....	447
27.1.3.5. Egypt .....	448
27.1.4. Purposes of Article 12(3) Declarations .....	448
27.2. Procedure Applicable to Article 12(3) Declarations in the Preliminary Examination Stage .....	451
27.2.1. Applying the Same Procedure to Article 12(3) Declarations as the Procedure Applied to the Prosecutor’s <i>Proprio Motu</i> Proceedings .....	451
27.2.2. Application of the Procedure to Article 12(3) Declarations and Its Consequence .....	454
27.2.2.1. The Procedure Applied to Article 12(3) Declarations .....	454
27.2.2.2. Lack of Judicial Oversight as a Consequence of the Application .....	455
27.2.2.3. Lack of Time Limits .....	457
27.3. Determination of the Validity of Article 12(3) Declarations ....	459
27.3.1. Authority to Determine Whether Palestine is Qualified as a State Capable to Make a Declaration....	459
27.3.2. Authority to Determine a Government of a State .....	463
27.3.3. Representative to Sign the Declaration on Behalf of the State.....	465
27.4. Conclusion and Suggestions .....	467

28. Making Sense of the Invisible: The Role of the ‘Accused’ during Preliminary Examinations .....	469
<i>By Dov Jacobs and Jennifer Naouri</i>	
28.1. Introduction .....	469
28.2. Quality Control of the Preliminary Examination Phase: Some Basic Groundings .....	472
28.2.1. The Nature of a Preliminary Examination.....	472
28.2.1.1. The Legal Nature of a Preliminary Examination .....	472
28.2.1.2. The ‘Investigative’ Nature of a Preliminary Examination .....	474
28.2.2. The Temporal Dimension of Quality Control.....	477
28.2.3. Quality Control of the Preliminary Examination Phase: A Question of Perspective .....	477
28.3. Jurisdiction and the Potential Defendant .....	480
28.3.1. Identifying a Potential Perpetrator during Preliminary Examination (from a Practical Perspective) .....	481
28.3.2. Current ICC/OTP Practice .....	483
28.3.3. Assessment of the OTP Practice .....	486
28.4. Admissibility and the Potential Defendant .....	489
28.4.1. Identifying alleged perpetrators when assessing complementarity. ....	489
28.4.1.1. OTP Policy .....	489
28.4.1.2. OTP Practice .....	492
28.4.1.3. ICC Case Law .....	495
28.4.2. Assessing Gravity .....	496
28.4.3. Critical Evaluation .....	501
28.4.3.1. Is a Determination of Admissibility a Legal Requirement during a Preliminary Examination?.....	501
28.4.3.2. Does a Discussion of Admissibility Have Any Practical Merit during a Preliminary Examination?.....	503
28.5. The Status of the ‘Accused’ during a Preliminary Examination.....	503

28.5.1. The Importance of Taking into Account the Potential Defendant during the Preliminary Examination .....	504
28.5.2. The Applicability and Scope of Article 55 during the Preliminary Examination .....	506
28.5.3. A New Formal Status for Potential Defendants? .....	510
28.5.4. Illustrating Differences in Approach: The Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon Situations .....	514
28.5.4.1. The Côte d'Ivoire Situation: Targeting an Individual with No Communication .....	514
28.5.4.2. The Gabon Situation: An Indication of Future Policy of the OTP towards a Potential Perpetrator? .....	516
28.6. Conclusion .....	518
29. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of Civil Society Submissions .....	521
<i>By Andreas Schüller and Chantal Meloni</i>	
29.1. Quality Control at the Preliminary Examination Stage: The Role of Civil Society Submissions and Practice at the Domestic Level in Germany .....	522
29.1.1. The Role of Civil Society in Developing Criminal Complaints: From Fact-finding to Submissions Triggering Preliminary Examinations .....	523
29.1.2. Preliminary Examinations in Germany and the Role of Civil Society Submissions .....	526
29.1.2.1. Selection Criteria in Universal Jurisdiction Cases .....	527
29.1.2.2. Duration of Preliminary Examinations .....	530
29.1.2.3. Transparency and Public Outreach .....	531
29.1.2.4. Limited Rights of Victims to Appeal a Decision .....	532
29.1.3. Conclusions on Quality Control of Preliminary Examinations in Germany through Civil Society Submissions .....	533
29.2. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination: Civil Society Submissions at the International Criminal Court .....	534
29.2.1. A Preliminary Observation .....	537
29.2.2. Can CSOs and Victims Effectively Participate and Counter-balance Prosecutorial Discretion before the Opening of an Investigation? .....	541
29.2.2.1. The Submission of Communications .....	542

29.2.2.2. Representations during Authorization to Open an Investigation .....	543
29.2.2.3. Intervention during the Judicial Review of the Decision Not to Open an Investigation ...	544
29.2.2.4. Lack of Powers with Regard to a Decision Not to Open an Investigation Based on Article 15(6) .....	546
29.2.3. Challenging the Prosecutor's Failure to Open Investigations in the absence of a Decision Not to Open an Investigation.....	547
29.2.4. Conclusions on Preliminary Examinations before the ICC.....	549
<b>30. Civil Society Participation in Preliminary Examinations .....</b>	<b>553</b>
<i>By Sarah Williams</i>	
30.1. Introduction .....	553
30.2. Civil Society, Preliminary Examinations and Article 15 Communications.....	556
30.2.1. The Nature of Preliminary Examinations and the Role of Article 15 Communications .....	556
30.2.2. Do Article 15 Communications Influence the Prosecutor? .....	558
30.2.3. Quality of Article 15 Communications and Standard of Review.....	563
30.2.4. What is the Aim of Article 15 Communications? .....	566
30.2.5. The Absence of Standing for Judicial Review in Preliminary Examinations .....	569
30.3. The <i>Amicus Curiae</i> and the Potential to Influence and Regulate Prosecutorial Discretion .....	575
30.3.1. The Amicus Curiae .....	575
30.3.2. Using the <i>Amicus Curiae</i> Mechanism to Influence the Prosecutor? .....	576
30.4. Conclusions .....	584

**PART 5**  
**THEMATICITY IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION**

31.	Quality Control in Preliminary Examination of Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in International Criminal Law: A Feminist Analysis .....	589
	<i>By Usha Tandon, Pratibha Tandon and Shreeyash U. Lalit</i>	
31.1.	Introduction .....	589
31.2.	Understanding the Feminist Perspective in Sexual Violence ....	592
31.2.1.	Reasons for Targeting Women .....	592
31.2.2.	Health Impairments of Sexualized Violence.....	594
31.2.3.	Effects of Gendered Stigma .....	595
31.3.	Feminist Engagements with the Rome Statute .....	596
31.4.	Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations .....	601
31.4.1.	Initiation of Preliminary Examinations.....	603
31.4.2.	Jurisdiction.....	604
31.4.3.	Admissibility.....	606
31.4.3.1.	Complementarity .....	606
31.4.3.2.	Gravity.....	610
31.4.4.	Interests of Justice.....	614
31.4.5.	The Lack of Concrete Time Frame .....	616
31.5.	OTP Policy Papers .....	617
31.5.1.	Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013 .....	617
31.5.2.	Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 2014 .....	619
31.5.3.	Feminist Dimensions of the Policy Papers .....	620
31.6.	Current Status of Preliminary Examinations <i>vis-à-vis</i> Sexual Offences.....	622
31.6.1.	Ongoing Preliminary Examinations.....	623
31.6.2.	Completed with Decision to Investigate .....	624
31.6.3.	Closed with Decision Not to Investigate .....	625
31.7.	Conclusion .....	626
32.	Preliminary Examinations and Children: Beyond Child Recruitment Cases and Towards a Children's Rights Approach.....	631
	<i>By Cynthia Chamberlain</i>	
32.1.	Introduction .....	631
32.2.	The Prosecutor's Policy on Children.....	632
32.3.	The Relevant Legal Framework .....	634

32.4.	Quality of Communications .....	639
32.5.	Analysing the Article 53 Test from a Children’s Rights Perspective.....	643
	32.5.1. Gravity .....	645
	32.5.2. Interests of Victims .....	646
	32.5.3. The Interests of Justice .....	650
32.6.	Conclusions .....	652
33.	Casting a Larger Shadow: Premeditated Madness, the International Criminal Court, and Preliminary Examinations .....	655
	<i>By Mark Kersten</i>	
33.1.	Introduction: Shadow Politics and the International Criminal Court.....	655
	33.1.1. Overview .....	658
33.2.	An Orthodox Understanding of Preliminary Examinations .....	659
33.3.	Preliminary Examinations and Assumptions about the ICC’s Desired Impact and Interests .....	663
33.4.	A ‘Madman Theory’ of Preliminary Examinations .....	668
	33.4.1. Nixon, Kissinger and ICC Preliminary Examination Strategies .....	668
	33.4.2. Growing Older, Growing Bolder: The ICC and Preliminary Examinations .....	670
33.5.	Strategies in the Preliminary Examination ‘Toolbox’: Thinking through Drawbacks .....	675
33.6.	Conclusion: An Opportunity to Think of Preliminary Examinations Creatively .....	679
34.	Open Source Fact-Finding in Preliminary Examinations .....	681
	<i>By Alexa Koenig, Felim McMahon, Nikita Mehandru and Shikha Silliman Bhattacharjee</i>	
34.1.	Introduction .....	681
34.2.	The Rise of Open Source Investigations for Intelligence Gathering and Human Rights Monitoring .....	684
	34.2.1. Brief History of Open Source Intelligence: 1853 to Present .....	685
	34.2.2. The Shifting Nature of the Internet: Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 .....	691
34.3.	The Use of Open Source Information to Advance Preliminary Examinations at the ICC.....	695

34.3.1. Guiding principles.....	698
34.3.1.1. Independence.....	698
34.3.1.2. Impartiality .....	699
34.3.1.3. Objectivity .....	700
34.3.2. Statutory Factors .....	701
34.3.2.1. Phases 1 and 2: Jurisdiction.....	701
34.3.2.2. Phase 3: Admissibility .....	705
34.3.2.3. Phase 4.....	708
34.3.3. Policy Considerations .....	709
34.4. Conclusion.....	710
 35. ICC Preliminary Examinations and National Justice: Opportunities and Challenges for Catalysing Domestic Prosecutions .	711
<i>By Elizabeth M. Evenson</i>	
35.1. Overview of the Preliminary Examination Process .....	713
35.2. Overcoming Inability and Unwillingness through Positive Complementarity .....	716
35.3. OTP's Approach to Encouraging National Proceedings in Preliminary Examinations .....	721
35.4. Key Challenges.....	722
35.4.1. Context Matters .....	722
35.4.2. Importance of Strategic Alliances .....	723
35.4.3. Passive v. Active Effects .....	723
35.4.4. Effects of the ICC's Admissibility Regime and OTP's Prosecutorial Policies.....	724
35.4.5. Absence of Timelines.....	726
35.4.6. Maintaining Leverage and the Use of Publicity .....	727
35.4.7. Limited Resources .....	729
 Index .....	731
TOAEP Team.....	741
Other Volumes in the Publication Series .....	743