

The Gambia's Rohingya Paradox

By Mustapha K. Darboe

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The Gambia's involvement in the persecution of the Rohingya Muslims came in 2015 when the West African country was itself a pariah state. It was under a brutal dictator, Yahya Jammeh, with enforcers called 'Junglers' who disappeared, tortured and left a large number of innocent citizens with everlasting scars.¹

In 2015, Jammeh offered his country as a sanctuary for the Rohingyas,² something many saw as a symbolic gesture with intent to launder his image and endear him to the Arab world, where he was getting significant support. The Gambia, a donor-dependent country, was mainly relying on support from the European Union ('EU') that was increasingly becoming critical of the country's human rights records.³ As the country's relations with the EU took a hit due to Jammeh's human rights records, he looked to the Arab world for support.

Thus, many saw the country's activism for the Rohingya rights not as a principled stance from a leader whose records show very little respect for human rights, but as an international public-relations machination for a dictator or yet another ploy to get closer to the Arab monarch for funding to salvage his cash-strapped, unpopular regime.⁴

Jammeh was also lobbying for several years to host the summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation ('OIC') in 2019,⁵ none of which could happen without the influence and the financial support of the Arabs. It was not long before Jammeh, in total disregard for the country's Constitution, declared the Gambia an Islamic state⁶ – shortly after the country's Supreme Islamic Council declared him 'Nasirudeen', which meant the leader of the people of faith.⁷

In December 2016, Gambians voted Jammeh out and replaced him with current President Adama Barrow.⁸ But as Jammeh, the idea of hosting the OIC was also an enviable achievement for Barrow which came into reality in May 2024.⁹ The work towards the summit started

soon after Barrow took power and the big chunk of the expected support was to come from the Arab countries.

Barrow promised more than just an OIC summit. Not only was he the Gambia's only politician to remove a president through the ballot box, he also came with a promise of hope, democracy and human rights. He would soon return the country to the International Criminal Court and the Commonwealth.¹⁰ A previously isolated country was emerging with a renewed desire to re-position itself as a human rights capital (being the home of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights), and it continued to influence decisions down the path to protecting the Rohingyas.

1. A Proxy for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

The OIC has taken a significant hit to its reputation for not doing enough to protect the Muslim minorities in Myanmar. It held a number of conferences with little impact. In 2018, as a concrete effort, the OIC created a ministerial committee to explore means to hold Myanmar accountable for crimes against the Rohingyas.¹¹ Perhaps as a result of a number of factors including its previous interest in the case of the Rohingyas in 2015 or the mere fact of having a justice minister – Abubacarr Tambadou – who worked on the Rwandan genocide, the Gambia was selected by the OIC to lead the ministerial committee.

Later, in May 2019, at an OIC summit in Saudi Arabia, the Organisation issued a communique asking the Gambia to file a case against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice ('ICJ'),¹² with support from the Organisation. The OIC requested member states to contribute to fund the case against Myanmar through an account created by the OIC.¹³

The Riyadh summit also granted the Gambia rights to host the OIC summit in 2022, which was later extended, at the Gambia's request for adequate preparation, to 2024. In their communique, the OIC also tasked its members to "support the host country and make efforts for the success of the Islamic Summit Conference in Banjul".¹⁴

2. Gains for the Big Boys Club

The Gambia is emerging from an old-school dictatorship with a lot of unresolved human rights violations and massive theft of public funds

Islamic Summit Conference, Makkah Al-Mukarramah, Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia", 31 May 2019, p. 19 ('OIC 2019 Summit Communique').

¹⁰ Kaddijatou Jawo, "Gambia to return to ICC, Commonwealth, says Barrow", *The Point*, 8 February 2017.

¹¹ Fatou Touray, "OIC back Gambia's cause in defending rights of Rohingyas", *Kerr Fatou*, 4 October 2021.

¹² The Gambia, State House, "OIC tasks Gambia to lead ICJ case against Myanmar", 2 June 2019; OIC 2019 Summit Communique, p. 11, see *supra* note 9.

¹³ "Gov't clarifies \$200,000 OIC funded legal fees for local team leading the case against Myanmar", *The Point*, 21 April 2021.

¹⁴ OIC 2019 Summit Communique, p. 19, see *supra* note 9.

¹ The Gambia, Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission, "Report, Volume 8: The Junglers, Unlawful Killings, Tortures and other Human Rights Violations", 24 December 2021 (<https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/hj4p4b1p/>).

² "Gambia opens arms to Rohingyas's Muslims", *Daily Sabah*, 25 May 2015.

³ Misha Hussain, "Middle East funds Gambia as EU cuts aid over human rights concerns", *Reuters*, 10 December 2014.

⁴ See Frederick Tiffin, "There's No Chance that the Rohingya People will end up in the Gambia", *Vice News*, 21 May 2015.

⁵ Musa Ndow, "Gambia bids to host OIC 2019 Summit", *AllAfrica*, 11 February 2013.

⁶ "Gambia's president declares Islamic statehood", *Al Jazeera*, 12 December 2015.

⁷ "SIC prexy, Mayor Colley say president deserves new titles", *The Standard*, 18 August 2014.

⁸ "Gambia's Jammeh loses to Adama Barrow in shock election result", *BBC News*, 2 December 2016.

⁹ See the Gambia-OIC Secretariat, "OIC Banjul Summit" (available on its web site) (held on 4–5 May 2024). See also, OIC, "Final Communiqué of the 14th

by Jammeh and his associates. The state institutions were run to the ground during this period. For instance, as the country made the decision to get involved in the Rohingya case, a politically-charged 2016 murder of opposition activist Ebrima Solo Sandeng was being prosecuted by a group of private lawyers because the Ministry of Justice ('MoJ') lacked the capacity to do it.¹⁵

While many critics felt the country's resources – human, time and material – are being stretched,¹⁶ for the lawyers, the case before the ICJ will pay well and bring international recognition. As of June 2021, the Gambia's MoJ officials received up to USD 200,000 for their participation in the Rohingya case.¹⁷

The news that Gambian officials were being paid for their participation in the case despite being salaried and given a *per diem* while on official trip in Banjul became very controversial. In reaction, the government explained that the fee for state lawyers was incorporated into the budget for the legal fees to Foley Hoag which was submitted to and approved by the OIC.¹⁸

A former Minister of Justice Abubacarr Tambadou became an international superstar, and so did his successor – with both getting paid (classified as honorarium) as part of the legal team. A major part of Tambadou's profile is his participation in the Gambia's case against Myanmar. He made the Time Magazine's list of '100 Most Influential People of 2020',¹⁹ and became a Nobel Peace Prize Nominee in 2021.²⁰ In each session at the ICJ, the participation of the country's lawyers is celebrated as a triumph of the country's first public university.²¹

3. The Stagnation at Home

The Gambia's case at the ICJ has been a great win for the international image of the small country, the Barrow administration, and the Gambian lawyers participating in the proceedings – but the case itself is led by a law firm, Foley Hoag.

But while the government does much for Muslims thousands of miles away, to the praise of the international community, it stands accused of failing to deliver justice to its own people whose rights were abused by their own government.²²

While Jammeh and Barrow stand for justice abroad, evidence shows they both look the other way in handling issues of justice back home – though at varying degrees. While Jammeh's abuses are evident in the series of reports written by the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparation Commission ('TRRC'),²³ Barrow's is evident in his hesitation to push for justice for Jammeh-era crimes and carry out institutional and political reforms to prevent future recurrence.²⁴

Barrow came to power on the backing of seven political parties and two independent candidates. He resigned from the main opposition party, the United Democratic Party ('UDP'), in whose executive he served as a treasurer. But soon after he got elected, his apparent

¹⁵ See Mustapha K. Darboe, "Gambia: death penalty for former leaders of the national intelligence agency", in *Justiceinfo.net*, 18 July 2022.

¹⁶ Ousman Gajigo, "Misplaced priorities: Why is Gambia suing Myanmar?", *The Standard*, 31 October 2019.

¹⁷ "Gov't clarifies \$200,000 OIC funded legal fees for local team leading the case against Myanmar", *The Point*, 21 April 2021.

¹⁸ Mustapha K. Darboe, "Is Gambia gov't truthful about "honorarium" to MOJ officials?", *Malagen*, 22 April 2021.

¹⁹ "Ba Tambadou makes Time Magazine's 100 Most Influential People List", *The Standard*, 24 September 2020.

²⁰ "Tambadou nominated for Nobel Prize", *The Standard*, 19 February 2021.

²¹ "A Moment of National Pride", The Fatu Network, *Facebook*, 16 January 2026.

²² See Gajigo, 2019, *supra* note 16; Yusef Taylor, "Jammeh's U.S. Mansion Funds Are Ready But Victims May Get Far Less", *Askanwi*, 3 December 2025.

²³ For an overview, see Mustapha K. Darboe, "TRRC Final report: Gambia between prosecutions and amnesties", in *Justiceinfo.net*, 7 January 2022 (with links to each volume of the final report).

²⁴ Mustapha K. Darboe, "Gambia doesn't give up on reparations", in *Justiceinfo.net*, 6 February 2026.

bias towards the UDP led to a fragmentation within the coalition.²⁵ The rest of the opposition distanced themselves while he dined with the UDP whose party supporters, including their leader, backed him to set aside a three-year transition agreement.²⁶ Soon tensions emerged. His ambition to run for a second term clashed with the presidential ambition of the UDP leader.

In the midst of tension, Barrow sacked the UDP leadership from his government,²⁷ and formed the National People's Party ('NPP'), on whose ticket he was to successfully seek a second term. The first casualty for this dramatic shift in Gambian politics was the reforms agenda Barrow and his 2016 coalition sold to the voters. At the time, the Gambia was little over two years to the presidential elections and the UDP enjoyed substantial political support in the country.²⁸ For example, the party had 22 out of 53 lawmakers, 6 out of 8 regional chairpersons, and a significant number of ward councilors. For Barrow, beating this political force meant he had to seek new allies. One would have thought the unlikeliest of those will be Jammeh's party or Jammeh himself, but Barrow struck a deal with Jammeh's Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction ('APRC') (which Jammeh later rejected while forming a movement now called the 'APRC no-to-alliance').²⁹ From that moment on, political consideration took a lead, and reforms or implementation of the recommendations of the inquiry into Jammeh's human rights abuses and corruption were pushed to the backburner.

A much more dramatic change came post the 2021 presidential elections. The leadership of the APRC who campaigned for the government to bin the TRRC's report³⁰ were appointed into various positions of responsibility including the speaker of the parliament – the third in line for the presidency of the Gambia. In fact, until about a year ago, the country's foreign minister who represented the Gambia and mobilized resources for the case against Myanmar – Mamadou Tangara – was a veteran public servant and minister under Jammeh, who not only defended his record abroad but also wrestled Gambian activists protesting against Jammeh during one of his trips to the United Nations General Assembly in the United States.³¹ Many critics thus say that the Gambian administrations, both of the immediate past and present, may be driven by publicity, money and recognition, not principles underpinning justice.

Aside from the unsettled abuses at home, the Gambia's international outrage has also been selective. Under Barrow, the country shows no discernible pattern of activism in certain foreign policy. While the Gambia purports to represent the conscience of the world, especially, as it deals with the plight of the Muslim minority, it remains silent on the plight of the Uighur Muslims in China,³² which has been a leading donor partner to the Gambia since 2017.³³

4. Stealing from Dictator's Victims

Justice is not the only thing the Barrow administration failed to deliver to the victims of Jammeh's oppression; it also appears to have been stolen from them. A National Assembly inquiry which followed

²⁵ "UDP expels 8 NAMs", *The Point*, 15 November 2019.

²⁶ "Darboe Cannot Speak for UDP – Madi Ceesay", *The Voice*, 5 September 2019.

²⁷ "Gambia: Vice President Darboe, Two UDP Ministers Sacked", *Jollofnews*, 15 March 2019.

²⁸ "Gambia's long-time opposition UDP wins absolute majority", *BBC News*, 7 April 2017.

²⁹ Omar Bah, "'APRC will not form alliance with any party'", *The Standard*, 13 January 2020.

³⁰ Mustapha K. Darboe, "Gambia: "We want Truth Commission's final report binned", in *Justiceinfo.net*, 9 September 2021.

³¹ Madi Jobarteh, "No to the Candidature of Mamadou Tangara for Commonwealth Secretary General", *Alkamba Times*, 3 September 2023.

³² Amnesty International, "China's Uighur Muslims: The Truth Behind the Headlines", 5 December 2019.

³³ The Gambia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad, "The Gambia and China Sign 100 Million Yuan Grant Agreement to Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation", 6 January 2026.

the investigative report of a local newspaper, *The Republic*, found widespread irregularities in the disposal of Jammeh's assets. Ironically, Barrow's justice ministers who filed the Rohingya case before the ICJ – Tambadou and Dawda Jallow (the current minister) – were both found culpable at varying degrees in the findings.³⁴

A 324-page report of a special committee of the National Assembly revealed fragmented institutional arrangements, a poor documentation culture, and serious lapses in inter-agency co-ordination throughout the process of the assets' disposal.³⁵ Assets were often handled through informal practices and without proper legal authority. Several state institutions and individuals who played a part in the disposals were indicted by the inquiry. These included Jallow who the Committee said should be reprimanded, while Tambadou was recommended for criminal proceedings.³⁶

A key highlight of the report is a strongly-worded exchange between the country's former Minister of Finance Mambury Njie and former Minister of Justice Tambadou where Njie complained of being sidelined in the disposal process, citing concerns over its legality and transparency. The lawmakers said:

According to the findings, the exclusion of the Ministry of Finance from the asset disposal process was a deliberate strategy employed by Hon. Tambadou to bypass legal financial controls [...]. By intentionally sidelining the Finance Minister and the Accountant General, he was able to create parallel financial systems and open unauthorized commercial bank accounts. This circumvention of the National Assembly's oversight and constitutional frameworks facilitated the pursuit of objectives that were entirely incompatible with the principles of transparency and fiscal accountability.³⁷

The proceeds from some of the asset sales and dividends were paid into a recovery account at a commercial bank instead of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, violating the country's 2014 Public Finance Act.³⁸ There were persistent gaps in documentation for bank account closures and fund transfers, with some dormant accounts still carrying balances or accruing charges.

There was poor institutional co-ordination too. At least six state institutions were involved in selling different things belonging to Jammeh. There was a lack of a centralized unit for all these institutions to report to, or proper oversight exercised by the MoJ, creating a fertile ground for non-transparent transactions to take place, thieving the public in the process.³⁹

Despite the corruption in the sale, Jammeh's assets yielded over D1.3 billion – about USD 23.7 million at the time of the sale. At least 35 real estate holdings including a vehicle garage, livestock, five aircraft, 458 vehicles, 197 tractors, shares in four companies, dividend payments from three companies, and valuable items found at Jammeh's Dunes Resort and Casino were sold.⁴⁰

And the administration is still struggling to pay little over a quarter of the reparations it is expected to pay to the victims after spending over a billion dalasis recovered from the sale of Jammeh's assets without public knowledge or scrutiny.⁴¹ The government has failed to explain how this money was spent. So far, only D70 million was mobi-

³⁴ Mustapha K. Darboe, "The assets of Gambia's former dictator go for a song", *The Republic*, 30 April 2025.

³⁵ See The Gambia, The Special Select Committee on the Inquiry into the Sale and Disposal of Assets Identified by the Commission of Inquiry into the Financial Activities of Public Bodies, Enterprises and Offices in their dealings with Former President Yahya Jammeh, "Report", March 2026 ('Report of the Special Select Committee') (<https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/z6vc21b8/>).

³⁶ Mustapha K. Darboe, "Gambia's reparation gap and botched sale of ex-dictator's assets", in *Justiceinfo.net*, 10 March 2026.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ See Report of the Special Select Committee, 2026, *supra* note 35.

⁴⁰ Darboe, 2026, see *supra* note 36.

⁴¹ Darboe, 2026, see *supra* note 24.

lized from the proceeds of Jammeh's assets – D50 million paid in 2019 and D20 million in 2026 – leaving over a hundred million of unpaid arrears to victims.⁴²

To put this into perspective, by December 2016, when Jammeh lost the election, his estimated worth was at least USD one billion. The Gambia's GDP, at the time, was also the same, and so was its public debt. This meant his wealth alone could have paid the country's public debt.⁴³ Yet, to date, there is no clarity as to how much money was raised from the sale of Jammeh's assets that were forfeited to the state.

In the meantime, a massive gap remains in the budget for the country's transitional justice programme, which the government intended to seek donors to fund. A staggering USD 214 million is the estimated cost of the completion of the reparations payment, the implementation of the recommendations of the TRRC, and the establishment of a hybrid court with the help of the regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to prosecute Jammeh-era crimes.

The laws that recently established the Reparation Commission (an office tasked with the responsibility of paying reparations and identifying new victims of the Jammeh regime's human rights violations which the TRRC may have missed) and an office of the special prosecutor (the expert who will lead the prosecution of Jammeh-era crimes) all stated proceeds from sale of Jammeh's assets as sources of revenue. Much confusion, however, still persists; while the US was expected to contribute, it closed the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) tap instead.

Meanwhile, Barrow continues to cherry-pick the implementation of the recommendations of the financial inquiry into Jammeh's dealings which led to the forfeiture of his assets. Out of political expediency, Barrow unbanned and appointed a number of people who were recommended to be banned from holding public office.⁴⁴ Some of these individuals hold very critical positions in government.

5. Stalled Reforms

While the Gambian government indulges in judicial activism abroad, Barrow betrays the social contract that binds him to the seat of power in Banjul. Much of the reforms promised are still unfulfilled. The Gambian leader campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption, press freedom, broader enjoyment of human rights, and, above all, ending what Barrow then referred to as a 'self-perpetuation' rule.⁴⁵ To accomplish these objectives, his coalition drafted a three-year transition programme. Barrow was to carry out the reforms and hold an election after three years in which he was not to participate.

However, he reneged and ran a second term.⁴⁶ In the midst of the intense political climate that ensued, the three most critical reforms promised by the coalition in Barrow's first term collapsed. The first was the promise to enact a two-term limit for the presidency. Not only did Barrow fail to stop at three years, he completed a second term, and is now running for a third term.⁴⁷

Second, a new constitution was to be drafted which would lay the foundation for a 'New Gambia' based on law, freedom and dignity.⁴⁸

⁴² Taylor, 2025, see *supra* note 22.

⁴³ Alagi Yorro Jallow, "Gambia's D58 billion Debt is Unpayable", *Jellofnews*, 25 July 2018.

⁴⁴ "Was President lifting the ban recommended by Janneh Commission legal?", *The Republic*, 6 March 2024; Omar Bah, "Activists react to unbanning of ex-Jammeh officials", *The Standard*, 30 January 2024. See also, Khadija Sharife and Mark Anderson, "The Inner Circle that Helped Jammeh Steal a Billion Dollars", in *Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project*, 27 March 2019.

⁴⁵ "Gambia's president-elect promises two-term limit for presidency", *Bulwark Intelligence*, 5 December 2016.

⁴⁶ Momodou Darboe and Omar Bah, "Mai warns Barrow against self-perpetuation, says attempting to cling onto power will crush him", *The Standard*, 25 September 2020.

⁴⁷ Dave Manneh, "The Gambia's democratic crossroads: How Barrow squandered the authority that made him", in *Eurasia Review*, 15 December 2025.

⁴⁸ Satang Nabaneh, "The Gambia's new constitution has stalled again – 5 reasons

The existing constitution, amended at least 58 times by Jammeh, was considered unfit for purpose.⁴⁹ These efforts collapsed in 2020 and 2024 – mainly as a result of political disagreement, the first being that Barrow felt that he was targeted by the draft. The 2020 draft introduced a clause counting his first term among the only two terms he could serve. After he and his allies rejected this draft, a diluted version of the same draft was re-introduced by Barrow’s cabinet in 2024, but was rejected by the opposition.

Third, a forensic examination of the human rights violations and the financial dealings of the Jammeh regime was being undertaken, with a view to holding the people found culpable to account, and reform laws and institutions to prevent recurrence. However, there has been a lack of genuine willingness to give effect to the Gambia’s flagship transitional justice programmes.⁵⁰

Despite these slow reforms, the Gambia has enjoyed a widening democratic space since 2016. The media, citizens and academics exercise greater freedom of expression. There has also been a notable growth in media houses. However, with the ambition to hold on to power come attempts to restrict the democratic space. In late 2025, the Gambia’s information minister attempted to introduce a new law and regulatory framework to subject journalists to government-based accreditation, an effort which received significant pushback from the Gambia Press Union and press freedom advocates.⁵¹

In 2020, barely a year before seeking a second term, mainly opposition activists staged a protest calling for Barrow’s resignation (as was provided for in his coalition agreement), but the government responded with more oppression. There was a heavy-handed response to protests in Banjul, and two radio stations were arbitrarily closed.⁵² The government has since maintained a targeted campaign against private media houses it considers uncooperative or allies of the opposition.⁵³ There were even allegations that the government mandated state-owned enterprises never to advertise with a selected number of media houses considered sympathetic to the opposition.⁵⁴

After a diagnostic assessment of corruption under Jammeh, the inquiry into his 22-year-old regime, has made a number of recommendations meant to boost institutional performance and reduce corruption. But the hope for such a systematic reform remains a pipedream, with the administration increasingly seen as continuing corrupt practices that permeated the Jammeh administration.⁵⁵

why and what that means for democracy”, *The Conversation*, 24 August 2025.

⁴⁹ Mustapha K. Darboe, “Gambia: How Jammeh weaponized the law”, in *Justicainfo.net*, 8 April 2021.

⁵⁰ Bakary Ceesay, “Gambia: Citizens Alliance Party Faults Barrow for Undermining Transitional Justice Process”, *Pan African Vision*, 27 September 2020.

⁵¹ Gambia Press Union, “GPU Position Paper on the Draft National Press Accreditation Policy and the Broadcasting and Online Content Regulations, 2025”, 17 March 2026; “Former Presidents of GPU Reject Return to ‘Permission-Based Journalism’ Amid New Accreditation Proposals”, *The Alkamba Times*, 16 March 2026.

⁵² “GPU says closure of radio stations is arbitrary & unlawful”, *The Point*, 28 January 2020.

⁵³ Gambia Press Union, “Critical media still continue to operate under duress in The Gambia”, *ifex*, 22 October 2024.

⁵⁴ See Tabora Bojang, “Minister denies directive stopping SOES from advertising on selected media”, *The Standard*, 17 August 2023.

⁵⁵ See Mustapha K. Darboe, “The tomato paste ploy & President’s business interest”, *The Republic*, 9 January 2026; Talibeh Hydara, “The opaque mining deal

One of the most controversial examples of this institutional decay involves a state-backed venture that established Barrow’s nephew as a major food commodity importer in the country. A local investigative journalism platform, *The Republic*, alleged that some D230 million state-guaranteed overdraft facility was granted to a private company tied to Sanneh under very irregular circumstances.⁵⁶ This deal, supported by a sovereign guarantee from the finance minister despite the company’s lack of a track record, has sparked outrage.

And like Jammeh’s regime, political patronage has crept into state governance. One of the key sponsors of Barrow’s NPP is businessman and media entrepreneur Haji Baniko Sissoho. Baniko has emerged as a key beneficiary of a lucrative contract to supply the country’s energy company, NAWEC, heavy fuel oil, a deal flagged by different auditors for its opacity.⁵⁷ When his critics pointed to several such adverse audits about key personalities in his administration, including in his office, Barrow reacted by stating that an “audit is an opinion”.⁵⁸

Finally, the creation of an Anti-Corruption Commission has also been stalled. It was only by the end of 2025 that its commissioners were nominated. The Commission has not been allocated funds yet and it hosts no staff, which will have to recruit during 2026. This means that the Commission will only effectively start operations in 2027.⁵⁹ Even where the Commission is currently active, two critical flaws affect its effectiveness. First, it can only take cases to court upon the approval of the Gambia’s justice minister, placing it under direct Executive control. Second, and more importantly, lawmakers allied with Barrow removed from the Commission’s ambit investigations concerning ‘unexplained wealth’.⁶⁰

Mustapha K. Darboe is an award-winning Gambian investigative journalist, a co-founder and former head of investigation of the investigative online paper Malagen, which he left to establish a similar platform, The Republic, in 2024. Darboe’s investigative works have led to several police inquiries and at least four successful court cases in the past six years. More recently, Darboe’s investigation into the fire sale and mishandling of the assets of former leader Yahya Jammeh led to three days of protest by young people, forcing the President to address the nation, after which the Parliament opened an inquiry. The story went on to win second place at the Africa Investigative Journalism Conference (AIJC) in November 2025.

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gambling with Gambia’s future”, *The Republic*, 30 April 2025.

⁵⁶ Mustapha K. Darboe, “Inside the multi-million-dollar Gambia gov’t venture that makes president’s nephew a major food importer”, *The Republic*, 17 September 2025.

⁵⁷ See “Complaints from Auditors at the National Audit Office”, What’s On Gambia, *Facebook*, 17 March 2026; “Haji Baniko’s Sissoho Oil Increases HFO Premium for NAWEC From US\$25 To US\$95”, *JollofNews*, 20 July 2025; “Documents ‘Link’ Ruling Party Executive Haji Baniko To Suspected D91M Dubious Vehicle Transaction”, *JollofNews*, 17 July 2025.

⁵⁸ Buba Gagigo, “President Barrow describes the audit report as an ‘opinion’”, *Kerr Fatou*, 18 March 2023.

⁵⁹ “Anti-Corruption Commission: What’s the hold up?”, *The Standard*, 3 December 2025.

⁶⁰ Binta Jaiteh, “Marr Nyang Raises Concern Over Watered-Down Anti-Corruption Bill”, *The Voice*, 26 September 2023.



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